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I. INTRODUCTION
In spite of the controversy that surrounds it, tax expenditure
analysis (TEA), at its core, is a simple, intuitively obvious idea. For
example, assume that recently independent hypothetical country
Newlandia uses a currency symbolized by "N" and that it also imposes
a 20-percent flat rate tax on annual net income in excess of an N5,000
exemption. Assume further that Newlandia's economy is principally
based on production of agricultural commodities with unstable prices.
Consequently, the Newlandian Parliament has decided to stimulate
manufacturing by providing a subsidy equal to five percent of the first
N20,000 of each taxpayer's net manufacturing income above the
N5,000 exemption. Thus, a taxpayer with N6,000 of net manufacturing
income for a particular year will receive an N50 subsidy,' the subsidy
for a taxpayer with N25,000 of net manufacturing income will be
N1,000,2 and no taxpayer's subsidy will exceed N1,000 per year.
The Newlandian Parliament has also considered the large number
of residents who were tragically disabled by landmines during the
(N6,000 - N5,000) x .05 = N50.
2 (N25,000 - N5,000) x .05 = N1,000.
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country's recent war for independence. It has decided to provide an
annual welfare benefit of N1,000 to each such victim.
Newlandia could implement the manufacturing stimulus through
annual tax-exempt cash payments equal to five percent of each tax-
payer's net manufacturing income between the N5,000 floor and the
N25,000 cap.3 The welfare benefit could be carried out in a similar
manner by sending each landmine victim an annual tax-exempt pay-
ment for N1,000.
Alternatively, Newlandia could effectuate the manufacturing
stimulus decision by reducing the 20-percent income tax rate to 15
percent with respect to each taxpayer's annual net manufacturing in-
come between N5,000 and N25,000. The result would be tax savings of
five percent of each taxpayer's net manufacturing income between the
floor and the cap.4 Similarly, Newlandia could implement the welfare
benefit by giving each landmine victim an additional N5,000 tax ex-
emption. This would annually provide N1,000 to each victim, assum-
ing that there were appropriate tax refunds to victims with incomes
less than the sum of the N5,000 basic exemption and the N5,000 addi-
-5tional exemption.
If Newlandia's taxpayers are rational and there are no significant
non-monetary differences in the Newlandian legal system between
tax-exempt cash payments and tax savings, taxpayers would be indif-
ferent as between the preceding alternatives because they would re-
ceive the same amounts from the government either way.
This simple example illustrates one of TEA's fundamental in-
sights, which is that when a taxpayer-favorable feature6 of income tax
Thus, a taxpayer with N6,000 of net manufacturing income in a particular year
would receive an N50 payment ([N6,000 - N5,000] x .05 = N50), a taxpayer with
N25,000 of net manufacturing income would receive an N1,000 payment ([N25,000 -
N5,000] x .05 = N1,000), and no taxpayer's cash payment would exceed N1,000.
4 Thus, a taxpayer with N6,000 of net manufacturing income in a particular year
would realize a tax savings of N50 ([N6,000 - N5,000] x [.20 - .15] = N50), a taxpayer
with N25,000 of net manufacturing income would realize N1,000 of tax savings
([N25,000 - N5,000] x [.20 - .15] = N1,000), and no taxpayer's tax savings would ex-
ceed N1,000. Compare with I.R.C. § 199 (effectively reducing the tax rate on income
from property manufactured in the United States through a special deduction mecha-
nism).
s Each victim's tax savings from the additional exemption would be N5,000 x
.20 tax rate = N1,000. Compare with I.R.C. § 63(c)(3), (conferring an additional stan-
dard deduction on individuals who are age sixty-five or older or who are blind).
6 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
344, § 3(a)(3), 88 Stat. 297, 299 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (giving the
following generally accepted list of taxpayer-favorable features: "provisions . . . which
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law' is used to provide a subsidy or incentive for a discrete income
source or taxpayer group," the effect is the same as a direct cash pay-
ment from the government to the beneficiaries. Accordingly, Internal
Revenue Code (Code) provisions of this sort should be subjected to
the same degree of dollar quantification and cost/benefit analysis as
actual disbursements from the U.S. Treasury.9
The relevant cost/benefit analysis should explore each tax expen-
diture's desirability as a government program, its efficacy, its behav-
ioral effects, its complexity costs for both taxpayers and the IRS, and
whether its benefits could be better achieved through a direct expen-
diture program.'0 In addition, because other taxpayers must bear
higher taxes in order to make up for the revenue shortfall resulting
allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which pro-
vide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability . . . .").
Tax expenditure analysis (TEA) also can be applied to consumption taxes and
wealth transfer taxes. See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES 233-39 (1985) [hereinafter SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES]. Its most important role in the United States, however, has been with
respect to the federal income tax, which will be the focus of this article.
Provisions are not tax expenditures unless their availability is limited to a par-
ticular income source or subset of taxpayers. Thus, the tax reduction from twenty per-
cent to fifteen percent in the above example would not be a tax expenditure if it ap-
plied to all, or most, of the Newlandian taxpayers. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. &
Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Di-
mension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 495-500 (2008) (discussing the difference between
generally applicable tax cuts and tax expenditures).
9 Although this article will focus on the application of TEA in the United
States, the initial example at supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text demonstrates
that TEA is applicable to the income tax system of any country. See Harry A. Shan-
non III, The Tax Expenditure Concept in the United States and Germany: A Compari-
son, 33 TAX NOTES 201 (Oct. 13, 1986) (discussing the development of TEA in Ger-
many); Wolfgang Sch6n, Taxation and State Aid Law in the European Union, 36
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 911 (1999) (discussing TEA in European Union law).
10 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR
& PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 83 (2005) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS], available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edultaxreformpanel/final-report/index.html; THE CENTURY
FOUNDATION WORKING GROUP ON TAX EXPENDITURES, BAD BREAKS ALL AROUND
51-52 (2002); CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, JUDGING TAX EXPENDITURES 25-26 (2009),
available at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/judgingtepll09.pdf; Eric T. Laity, The Corporation
as Administrative Agency: Tax Expenditures and Institutional Design, 28 VA. TAX
REV. 411 (2008); see also Edward D. Kleinbard, Tax Expenditure Framework Legisla-
tion, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 353, 372-75 (2010) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Framework Legisla-
tion] (suggesting an important role in this process for the House and Senate commit-
tees that have expertise regarding the subject matter of the particular tax
expenditures).
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from tax expenditures, the cost/benefit analysis should also examine
tax burden distribution effects." Finally, because tax expenditures are
de facto government programs that expand the impact of government,
the cost/benefit analysis should examine the effect of tax expenditures
on the size and role of government.12 The purpose of TEA is to trigger
. * 13these important inquiries.
TEA has been a significant component of U.S. tax policy debates
since it was introduced by Stanley Surrey in 196714 and each year both
the U.S. Treasury Department and the Staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation of the U.S. Congress produce separate tax expenditure
budgets listing all federal income tax provisions that fall under the tax
expenditure rubric." This exercise reveals that tax expenditures ac-
count for an enormous part of the fiscal impact of the federal govern-
ment. For example, a recent study estimated that for 2010, federal tax
16
expenditures would total $1.16 trillion. Thus, it is no surprise that the
" See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 10, at 83; THE CENTURY FOUNDATION WORKING GROUP ON TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 10, at 52.
12 See CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 6; Daniel N. Shaviro, Re-
thinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REv. 187, 197, 204 (2004)
[hereinafter Shaviro, Rethinking]. One major concern is that tax expenditures "can
mask government funding levels and allocations and obscure accountability for out-
comes being funded." Mary L. Heen, Congress, Public Values, and the Financing of
Private Choice, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 912 (2004).
13 See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8, at 446-49, 487-89.
14 Surrey introduced TEA into the tax policy consciousness of the United States
by means of a speech to a financial industry professional group in 1967. See Stanley S.
Surrey, The United States Income Tax System - The Need for Full Accounting, in
TAX POLICY AND TAX REFORM: 1961-1969 575, 575-85 (William F. Hellmuth & Oliver
Oldman eds., 1973) [hereinafter Surrey, Full Accounting]; see also STANLEY S.
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 33 (1973) [hereinafter SURREY, PATHWAYS];
SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES , supra note 7, at 88.
15 See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub L. No.
93-344, § 601, 88 Stat. 297, 323 (requiring the President's annual budget submission to
contain a list of tax expenditures); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH
CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013, at
1, n.2 (Joint Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
2010 ESTIMATES] (explaining that the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has
produced its own tax expenditure list each year since 1972).
16 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 110TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES:
COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 12-13
(Comm. Print 2008); see also LEONARD BURMAN, ERIC TODER & CHRISTOPHER
GEISSLER, How Big Are Total Individual Income Tax Expenditures, and Who Benefits
from Them? 13 (The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center 2008), available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001234_tax-expenditures.pdf.
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literature commenting on and analyzing TEA is now vast and reflects
17
a wide range of views regarding the efficacy of TEA.
Although some commentators have regarded the validity of TEA
as obvious," the general tone of the literature in the United States has
17 For a recent review and evaluation of this literature, see Fleming & Peroni,
supra note 8. This literature concentrates almost exclusively on "positive" tax expen-
ditures - income tax provisions that lose revenue for the fisc. However, the Code
also contains "negative" tax expenditures or tax penalty provisions - income tax
provisions that cause taxable income to be overstated, thereby bringing revenue into
the fisc that it would not receive under a theoretically correct income tax. See also
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX
EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS, at 39, 47 (Joint Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION]; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL YEAR 2009, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 321-22 (2008) [hereinafter OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, 2009 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES]. An example is the section
162(f) prohibition against deducting fines and penalties even when the payments arise
directly out of business activity. These negative tax expenditures or tax penalty provi-
sions depart from a theoretically correct income tax base and can be distortive. Thus,
as the Joint Committee Staff's 2008 report properly suggests, they should be subjected
to the same cost/benefit analysis as positive tax expenditures. For a policy critique of
tax penalty provisions, see Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis
of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1989).
See, e.g., BURMAN, TODER & GEISSLER, supra note 16, at 2 ("[M]ost public
finance economists believe that measuring tax expenditures is an important part of
good budget management because tax expenditures can be designed to have the same
effect on beneficiaries as direct spending programs and therefore impose the same
opportunity costs in terms of higher taxes, reduced federal spending, and higher defi-
cits."); Michael J. Graetz, Tax Policy Challenges, 121 TAX NOTES 1439, 1447 (Dec. 22,
2008) ("And, when tax expenditures as failed policy is the topic, the healthcare story
is not an isolated example .... The essential problem is this: presidents from both po-
litical parties and Congress today use tax exclusions, deductions and credits the way
my mother used chicken soup, as a cure-all for every economic and social ill the coun-
try faces."); Thomas L. Hungerford, Tax Expenditures and Long-Term Federal
Budget Pressures, 121 TAX NOTES 1409, 1415 (Dec. 22, 2008) ("Tax expenditures ac-
count for a large proportion of the resources the federal government uses to achieve
various national goals."); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress:
How Tax Expenditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U.
L. REv. 1, 3 (2010) ("Tax expenditures not only distort tax policy and obfuscate our
understanding of our Government's operations; they also adversely affect the work-
ings of Congress."); Marjorie Kornhauser, A Legislator Named Sue: Re-Imagining the
Income Tax, in CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 75, 79 (Anthony C. In-
fanti & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2009) ("The current Code is riddled with tax expen-
ditures aimed at both corporate and individual taxpayers alike."); Martin A. Sullivan,
Economic Analysis - Tax Expenditures for Republicans, 94 TAX NOTES 1571, 1572
(Mar. 25, 2002) ("Everybody knows that a tax expenditure is just a government
spending program masquerading as a tax cut.").
140
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been disparaging.19 One of the most prominent criticisms came in 2005
when the Office of Management and Budget stated that "the [Bush]
Administration believes that the concept of 'tax expenditure' is of
questionable analytic value." 20
Some attacks on TEA are part of an effort to replace the federal
income tax with a consumption tax regime by gradually adding con-
sumption tax features to the Internal Revenue Code.21 TEA is seen as
an obstacle to this goal because it characterizes most of the Code's
22
consumption tax elements as tax expenditures. Other criticisms seem
motivated by a desire to preserve particular tax benefits that TEA ex-
poses as subsidies23 and some attacks are based on asserted structural
1 See Bruce Bartlett, The End of Tax Expenditures As We Know Them?, 92
TAX NOTES 413 (July 16, 2001); Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsi-
dies" in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969) [hereinafter Bittker, Ac-
counting]; Charlotte Crane, The Income Tax and the Burden of Perfection, 100 Nw. U.
L. REV. 171, 184 (2006) (characterizing TEA as "an academic obsession"); Thomas D.
Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343,
345-66 (1989) (arguing, in part, that Surrey's tax expenditure model is not grounded
in any principle of distributive justice); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax
Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (Mar. 30, 1992); Bernard
Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 HARV. L. REV. 491 (1985) (re-
viewing SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 7).
20 Letter of James D. Foster, Assoc. Dir. of Econ. Pol'y, Office of Mgmt. and
Budget 2 (Sept. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Foster Letter], in U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-05-690, TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL
COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 83 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter GAO,
FEDERAL COMMITMENT] (quoting the Bush administration's 2002 budget presenta-
tion).
21 See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
22 See STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMMITTEE, 106TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: A
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 5-6 (Joint Comm. Print 1999) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT
ECON. COMM., REVIEW]; Bartlett, supra note 19, at 420; see also Martin A. Sullivan,
Administration Reignites Old Battle Over Tax Expenditures, 91 TAX NOTES 701 (Apr.
30, 2001) ("Republicans generally favor consumption taxes over income taxes .... If
taxes on capital, on estates, and on foreign income were removed from the normal tax
system used as a baseline for scoring tax expenditures, the tax expenditures budget
would be transformed . . . to a positive force for the types of change Republicans
seek."); Heen, supra note 12, at 896.
23 At the Tax Foundation's November 16, 2000, national conference, then
Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers praised the Clinton's administration's edu-
cation tax credits and the expanded earned income tax credit and criticized TEA be-
cause of its resistance to those and other tax expenditures that promote "very impor-
tant values." Christopher Bergin, Summers Says It's Important to Promote "Values"
Through the Code, 89 TAX NOTES 994, 994 (Nov. 20, 2000); see also Peter J. Wieden-
beck, Paternalism and Income Tax Reform, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 675, 688-99 (1985).
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or theoretical flaws in TEA. 24 The critiques have ranged from specula-
tion regarding TEA proponents' personal motives2 to the argument
that tax policy is irrelevant to the formation of public policy and,
therefore, TEA should be ignored because it is a tax policy instru-
26
ment. The strongest attacks, however, have focused on the TEA
baseline. For example, one prominent tax scholar has recently as-
serted that "[w]here tax expenditure analysis went off the rails ... was
not in its aim of identifying 'special' provisions ... but in its means of
doing so, through the identification of a supposedly canonical, yet in
practice under-theorized ... definition of the 'normative income tax
base."' 27
The baseline issue arises because TEA deals with tax provisions
that confer preferential treatment on particular income sources or
taxpayer groups, as illustrated by the hypothetical at the beginning of
this article. To identify such provisions, there must first be a baseline
tax system from which the preferential provisions can be said to devi-
281
ate in a taxpayer-favorable way. Stated differently, an income tax
provision cannot be properly considered a tax expenditure if its exis-
tence is required to implement the baseline income tax system. For
example, the section 162 deduction for business expenses is not a tax
expenditure, even though it benefits taxpayers by reducing their tax-
able income, because the deduction is a normative element in the
definition of the base of a net income tax.29
24 See generally Bartlett, supra note 19; Bittker, Accounting, supra note 19.
25 See Bartlett, supra note 19, at 414 ("Surrey clearly intended the term 'tax ex-
penditure' to be pejorative, undermining political support for tax preferences.");
Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking, supra note 12, at 201-02, 204-05 ("[TEA] seems to be
viewed in many circles as logically dubious special pleading in support of a particular
policy agenda.").
26 See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 972-82 (2004). For our response to this argument, see
infra notes 156-165 and accompanying text.
27 Shaviro, Rethinking, supra note 12, at 199. We believe, however, that the lit-
erature summarized in Part III.A. of this article, infra, shows that the traditional TEA
baseline is not under-theorized.
See, e.g., Bittker, Accounting, supra note 19, at 247 ("What is needed is not an
ad hoc list of tax provisions, but a generally acceptable model, or set of principles,
enabling us to decide with reasonable assurance which income tax provisions are de-
partures from the model, whose costs are to be reported as 'tax expenditures"').
29 Nor is the deduction in section 212(1) or (2) for the expenses of earning in-
come from a non-business income-producing activity a tax expenditure for much the
same reason. Expenses of earning income are neither consumption nor additions to
saving, and, therefore, should be deducted when computing the tax base of a net in-
come tax. See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
142 [Vol. 30:135
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Although the preceding discussion has dealt with TEA exclusively
in an income tax context, we recognize that from the beginning TEA
has been seen as fully relevant to consumption taxes.30 Indeed, if the
United States were to replace or supplement the federal income tax
with a consumption tax, TEA would be critically important with re-
spect to the latter because consumption taxes can be loaded with tax
expenditures just like an income tax.3' TEA's application to a federal
HARV. L. REV. 309, 313 (1972) [hereinafter Andrews, Personal Deductions]; Boris I.
Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 16
J.L. & ECON. 193, 202-03 (1973) [hereinafter Bittker, Personal Expenditures]. It is
true that the progressive rate structure gives the deduction for these costs an upside-
down effect because the resulting tax savings of high-bracket taxpayers are a greater
percentage of deducted costs than is the case for deductions by low-bracket taxpayers.
The denial of deductions for income-producing costs, however, would amount to im-
posing a tax penalty, thereby causing an economic distortion. See SURREY &
McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 7, at 80; Bittker, Personal Expenditures,
supra, at 199. On the other hand, replacing the deductions for income-producing costs
with credits would be problematic because setting the credit rate at the highest mar-
ginal tax rate would give lower-bracket taxpayers a windfall (indeed, they would be
tax expenditure beneficiaries) and setting the credit rate at any level below the high-
est marginal rate would effectively penalize top-bracket taxpayers. See generally id. at
209. Moreover, the upside-down effect of allowing deductions for income-producing
costs "merely confirms the fact that the rate structure is progressive." Id. at 208. On
balance, the allowance of deductions for income-producing costs is the best approach.
Nevertheless, in a few situations, even normative deductions can present suffi-
cient complexity and administrability problems to warrant their being limited or disal-
lowed in spite of the income mismeasurement that results from doing so. See, e.g.,
I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(1), (a)(2), 63(b), 67 (which effectively disallow the deduction of most
unreimbursed employee business expenses and income-producing expenses of an in-
vestment activity that does not involve rent or royalty income); I.R.C. § 274(n) (which
generally disallows the deduction of fifty percent of business meals and entertainment
expenses). Some commentators (including one of the authors of this article), however,
have argued that I.R.C. § 67 is not an appropriate element of a properly designed in-
come tax system. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Kahn, Beyond the Little Dutch Boy: An Argu-
ment for Structural Change in Tax Deduction Classification, 80 WASH. L. REV. 1
(2005); Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in the Individual
Income Tax System, 91 TAX NoTES 1415 (May 28, 2001). Section 67 can be viewed as
a negative tax expenditure or tax penalty provision, which should be subjected to a
TEA-style cost/benefit analysis. For a discussion of tax penalty provisions, see gener-
ally supra note 17.
0 See SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 14, at 21.
31 See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Scoping Out the Uncertain Simplification (Compli-
cation?) Effects of VATs, BATs and Consumed Income Taxes, 2 FLA. TAx REV. 390,
398-99 (1995) (discussing tax expenditures in a VAT regime); Comm. on Simplifica-
tion, Section of Tax'n, American Bar Ass'n, Complexity and the Personal Consump-
tion Tax, 35 TAX LAW. 415, 433-34 (1982) (discussing tax expenditures in a cash-flow
consumption tax regime).
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consumption tax would obviously require a consumption tax baseline
that would remove many items from the tax expenditures category
32that are considered tax expenditures under an income tax baseline,
although certain items that are tax expenditures with reference to an
income tax baseline would also be tax expenditures if they were in-
33
cluded in a consumption tax regime.
At present, however, the federal income tax is predominantly an
income tax. To be sure, it contains certain consumption tax elements
but those elements do not impeach the basic income tax character of
the federal income tax.34 As we have argued in earlier work, the
presence of consumption tax features in the federal income tax simply
means that it is a Schanz-Haig-Simons (SHS) income tax with tax ex-
penditures that are constructed to achieve consumption tax results in
narrowly targeted areas. Thus, because the federal income tax is an
income tax and because, in the United States, TEA has been almost
exclusively focused on income taxation, this article will deal with the
TEA baseline controversy purely in an income tax context.
Surrey insisted that the baseline income tax system for purposes
of identifying tax expenditures was a regime grounded in the SHS
definition of income,36 modified to incorporate widely accepted busi-
ness accounting standards and the generally accepted structure of an
income tax. In prior work, we have explained that we agree with Sur
32 See OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET, 2009 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17,
at 318-21.
An example is the present section 163(h)(3) deduction for interest payments
on amounts borrowed for personal purposes that are excluded from gross income and
secured by a mortgage on a personal residence. See OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET,
2009 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17, at 320; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 124-25 (Jan. 17, 1977) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS].
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17,
at 16 ("[T]he current Internal Revenue Code is at heart an income tax.. .
3s See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8, at 511-17.
The most prominent statement of this SHS definition is:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market
value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of
the store of property rights between the beginning and the end of the pe-
riod in question. In other words, it is merely the result obtained by adding
consumption during the period to "wealth" at the end of the period and
then subtracting "wealth" at the beginning.
HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
3 See SURREY & McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 7, at 3-4. The
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rey on this point so long as it is understood that the SHS definition is
simply a convenient device for implementing the deeper tax policy
norm of ability-to-pay.38
Critics have continuously and strongly attacked TEA by charac-
terizing the SHS baseline as unprincipled,39 imprecise,40 and insuffi-
ciently related to our hybrid income/consumption tax system as it ac-
tually exists.4 1 Since the baseline is hopelessly defective, so the critics
argue, TEA is fatally dysfunctional and the results of its application to
the various subsidy and incentive provisions in the Internal Revenue
42Code can be disregarded.
This line of attack can be countered by refuting the criticisms of
Treasury Department states that the principal modifications that it makes to the SHS
definition for this purpose are:
1. There is a separate, unintegrated corporate income tax;
2. Generally, there are no inflation adjustments to values of assets and
debts;
3. Individual income tax rates below the highest rate are not considered
deviations from the baseline; and
4. Income is taxable only when realized.
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 298, 307
(2009). The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation is in general agreement with the
Treasury Department regarding these modifications. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 2010 ESTIMATES, supra note 15, at 4-10. Interestingly, Henry Simons, the
principal American architect of the SHS definition, did not seem to regard the lower
rates in the progressive rate tables for individuals as deviations from the baseline, see
SIMONS, supra note 36, at 18-25, 218-20, and he was quite clear in stating that the re-
alization principal was not a deviation. See id. at 100, 207-08. Thus, Simons would re-
gard Treasury's fourth modification above as unnecessary and would likely take the
same view with respect to the third modification.
See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8, at 450-61.
See, e.g., Kahn & Lehman, supra note 19, at 1663 (asserting that tax expendi-
ture budgets "create only an illusion of value-free scientific precision in a heavily poli-
ticized domain").
See generally Bartlett, supra note 19; Kahn & Lehman, supra note 19.
41 See, e.g., Daniel S. Goldberg, The U.S. Consumption Tax: Evolution, Not
Revolution, 57 TAX LAW. 1, 28 (2003); Shaviro, Rethinking, supra note 12, at 215-16;
Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 407, 427, 429 (1999).
42 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., REVIEW, supra note 22, at 8; see also
Edward D. Kleinbard, Letter to the Editor, The Need for a JCT: Kleinbard Responds
to Yin, 126 TAX NOTES 991, 991 (Feb. 22, 2010) (characterizing the SHS baseline as
"largely discredited").
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the SHS baseline. We have undertaken to do so in an earlier piece43
and some of our arguments will be summarized in Part IV of this arti-
cle. Nevertheless, even some TEA supporters have suggested that
TEA's effectiveness has been compromised by the intensity of the
"baseline battle.""
In this vein, a 2008 report of major importance by the Staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation of the U.S. Congress argued that even if
the attacks on the TEA baseline were unwarranted, they had so seri-
ously compromised TEA's effectiveness that adoption of an alterna-
tive baseline was called for.45 The report's pertinent language states:
Driven off track by seemingly endless debates about what
should and should not be included in the. . . [SHS baseline],46
tax expenditure analysis today does not advance either of the
two goals that inspired its original proponents: clarifying the
aggregate size and application of government expenditures,
and improving the Internal Revenue Code.
Whether these criticisms are correct is less important ... than
is the observation that they are prevalent. Tax expenditure
analysis is useful to policymakers only if its conclusions are
widely agreed to be neutral, in both a political and an eco-
nomic sense. The breadth and depth of the criticism of the
43 See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8. Regarding a remarkable transformation
by a long-time TEA critic into a TEA advocate, compare Bartlett, supra note 19, with
Bruce Bartlett, Spending Through the Tax Code, FORBES.COM (May 28, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/27/finance-economy-tax-code-opinions-
columnists-bruce-bartlett.html ("Tax credits are really just spending disguised as a tax
cut .... Those concerned about our nation's fiscal future should be focusing as much
attention on tax expenditures as they do on the spending side of the budget.").
4 See Michael J. McIntyre, A Solution to The Problem of Defining a Tax Expen-
diture, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 79, 81, 102-03 (1980); Shaviro, Rethinking, supra note
12, at 217-18.
4 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17,
at 7-8, 36-37.
4 The report actually uses the term "normal tax base" at this point. However,
the report also clearly states that the normal tax base is the Haig-Simons definition of
income. See id. at 19, 29. We refer to this construct as the "Schanz-Haig-Simons"
definition in order to reflect the contribution of the German scholar Georg Schanz.
See SIMONS, supra note 36, at 60-61. Therefore, we have substituted "SHS baseline"
for "normal tax base" when quoting from the report. Use of the terms "Schanz-Haig-
Simons" and SHS is not idiosyncratic on our part. Others have done so. See, e.g.,
SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 7, at 4 (referring to "Schanz-
Haig-Simons" and "S-H-S").
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present ... [SHS] 47 tax base suggests that such agreement, if it
ever existed, cannot be obtained in the current environment.
In light of these realities, the JCT Staff believes that it is ap-
propriate to revisit our tax expenditure methodology, in order
to refashion it in a manner that will generally be viewed as
more neutral and more principled than the current
48implementation.
In response, the report stated that going forward, the Joint Com-
mittee Staff would neutralize the critics by abandoning the SHS base-
line and promoting a version of TEA that, to some extent, had no
normative baseline and that disregarded the SHS definition even in
the area where a baseline was used.49 Then, early in 2010, the Staff to-
tally reversed itself by abandoning its non-normative approach and re-
embracing the SHS baseline.0 Because the Joint Committee Staff is
arguably the most important non-partisan governmental voice in U.S.
tax reform debates," its rejection of the SHS baseline in favor of a
supposedly neutral approach,52 followed by its 2010 return to SHS or-
thodoxy, is not merely a short-lived curiosity. Instead, this event is a
manifestation of the practical and theoretical difficulties involved in
the critically important, longstanding TEA baseline controversy and it
merits close analysis to see what light it sheds on the correct resolu-
tion of that controversy.
Although the Joint Committee Staff described its 2008-2010 base-
47 See supra note 46.
48 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17,
at 1, 37 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
49 See id. at 39-47.
50 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 2010 ESTIMATES, supra note 15, at
4-5. This reversal has been criticized by Professor Edward D. Kleinbard, who was the
Joint Committee's Chief of Staff when the 2008-2010 baseline was adopted but who
had left for an academic position when the return to the SHS baseline occurred. See
Kleinbard, Framework Legislation, supra note 10, at 368 n.19. He has suggested that
Congress could improve its control over tax expenditures by, inter alia, legislatively
adopting the 2008-2010 baseline. Id. at 369.
The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation is a non-partisan group of law-
yers, economists and accountants. See The Joint Committee On Taxation, Overview,
http://www.jct.gov/about-us/overview.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2010); see also George
K. Yin, Should Congress Abolish the Joint Committee on Taxation?, 126 TAx NOTES
861 (Feb. 15, 2010).
52 The Joint Committee Staff characterized its 2008-2010 approach as "more
principled and neutral" than the SHS baseline. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17, at 39.
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line as a "new paradigm,",3 its work was actually presaged by earlier
efforts of tax scholars to develop a version of TEA that did not rely on
the SHS baseline. In Part II of this article, we examine the precursors
to the 2008 work of the Joint Committee Staff. In Part III, we describe
and evaluate the Staff's 2008-2010 "new paradigm." More impor-
tantly, we explain why that well-intentioned work was actually harm-
ful to the defense of TEA and why the Staff's 2010 re-embrace of the
SHS baseline is a welcome development. Part IV explains that be-
cause the attacks on the traditional SHS baseline of TEA are mis-
guided, it was never necessary to abandon that baseline in order to de-
fend the TEA construct. Part V summarizes our analysis and
1 4
conclusions.
II. THE ROAD TO THE "NEW PARADIGM"
The Joint Committee Staff's effort to decouple TEA from the
SHS definition of income was not as groundbreaking as it might ap-
pear. It was anticipated by the earlier work of Michael McIntyre and
Seymour Feikowsky, which we now discuss.
A. Professor McIntyre's Rhetorical Baseline
In the view of Professor Michael McIntyre, Surrey's version of
TEA contains a seriously problematic internal conflict. It is that TEA
requires a baseline for distinguishing subsidies or incentives from le-
gitimate components of a theoretically correct income tax system but
that Surrey's use of the SHS definition for this purpose has "subjected
[TEA] to attack""5 and provoked a "heated debate that ... pulls into
its vortex all who venture near."56 The implication is that this contro-
versy has reduced TEA's effectiveness. Professor McIntyre's solution
See id. at 1; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES
OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008-2012, at 1 (Joint Comm.
Print 2008) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 2008 ESTIMATES].
At present there is a small body of literature that discusses the creation of
governmental structures for assuring that TEA is regularly and rigorously applied to
existing and proposed tax expenditures. See, e.g., SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 7, at 112-17; Heen, supra note 12; Kleinbard, Framework
Legislation, supra note 10. Because the relevance of this literature depends on first
establishing that TEA is a valid and workable construct and because that point is
critically dependent on the outcome of the baseline controversy, this article focuses
on the baseline controversy.
McIntyre, supra note 44, at 102-03.
5 Id. at 103.
2010] A Critique of the "New Paradigm" and Its Denouement
is to adopt what might be called a rhetorical baseline because he says
that instead of using a normative standard to identify tax expendi-
tures, we should listen to the language employed by the defend-
ers/promoters of various tax provisions and apply TEA only to the ex-
tent that the tax provisions in question are advocated on the basis of
spending-like benefits. Specifically, he says that "[t]ax specialists
should apply the tax expenditure analysis to any tax provision de-
fended on nontax grounds"" and that "the bare assertion that the tax
rule under examination promotes a spending goal [should trigger] tax
expenditure analysis.", 8 In his view, this linguistic methodology
"would allow Congress to accomplish its legislative reform objectives
without having to distinguish tax expenditures from normal tax
rules" 9 and, therefore, the McIntyre approach "eliminates the feature
that has subjected [TEA] to attack."60 The clear implication is that tax
provisions that are not promoted as having subsidy or incentive effects
cannot be classified as tax expenditures.6'
We doubt that Professor McIntyre's rhetorical method is a suit-
able solution to the attacks on TEA. The rhetorical baseline would
likely cause advocates of tax subsidies and incentives to merely avoid
expenditure-type language and, instead, defend their tax benefits on
the grounds that they mitigate disincentives. For example, the various
retirement savings incentives in the Internal Revenue Code are often
62defended as measures to overcome the Code's bias against saving,
the preference for long-term capital gains is defended as necessary to
63
counter a "lock-in" effect resulting from the realization doctrine, and
the temporary repatriation tax holiday provided by the now-expired
section 965 was promoted as necessary to mitigate a "lock-out" effect
arising from the general rule of deferring tax on the income of U.S.-
controlled foreign subsidiaries until the income is repatriated to the
United States.6' Additionally, advocates of certain incentives and sub-
5 Id. at 101.
Id. at 100.
5 Id. at 87.
Id. at 102.
61 See id. at 100.
62 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 10, at 89-93.
See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 135, 282 (4th ed.
2008).
64 See Martin A. Sullivan, High-Tech Firms Bring Home $58 Billion, 112 TAX
NOTES 556 (Aug. 14, 2006). Section 965 is inapplicable to dividends received in any
taxable year starting on or after October 22, 2004. For a policy critique of section 965,
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sidies would surely assert that their tax benefits should be adopted or
preserved because they are actually part of a normative income tax
and not because they produce spending-type benefits. For example,
the general rule of deferral of U.S. tax on foreign-source business in-
come earned by U.S.-controlled foreign corporations is often de-
fended as being part of the normative income tax system because it is
said to be an inevitable consequence of the separate juridical status of
corporations and their shareholders.65
In other words, because Professor McIntyre's approach makes a
tax provision's status as a tax expenditure wholly dependent on the
rhetoric used by the provision's defenders, the promoters of tax subsi-
dies and incentives would quickly make the necessary rhetorical shifts,
thereby removing many, perhaps most, tax expenditures from the am-
bit of TEA and TEA would be significantly impaired even if it were
also protected from critics of Surrey's SHS baseline. On the other
hand, if Professor McIntyre intends for policy makers to look behind
rhetorical shifts and make an independent determination as to
whether particular tax provisions are subsidies or incentives, then a
baseline tax system will be needed to sort subsidies and incentives
from normative tax provisions and we will have returned to the very
controversy that Professor McIntyre sought to avoid. Alternatively, if
Professor McIntyre intends for policy makers to defeat rhetorical
shifts by looking at the language that was used to promote particular
subsidies and incentives before the adoption of his rhetorical ap-
proach to TEA, he may be successful in maintaining the tax expendi-
ture label for some old subsidies and incentives. However, well-
advised promoters of new provisions will likely avoid tax expenditure
classification by using informed rhetoric in their advocacy. Moreover,
the beneficiaries and defenders of old provisions will likely bring forth
new iterations of those provisions which purport to replace them with
a "different" scheme that relies on supporting rhetoric untainted by
subsidy and incentive language. All of these considerations suggest
that if Professor McIntyre's rhetorical baseline were adopted, the ef-
fectiveness of TEA would be rapidly undermined.
In spite of our doubts regarding Professor McIntyre's rhetorical
baseline, we believe that it has a useful role as a supplement to tradi-
see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Eviscerating the Foreign Tax Credit
Limitations and Cutting the Repatriation Tax - What's ETI Repeal Got To Do With
It?, 104 TAX NOTEs 1393 (Sept. 20, 2004).
6 See, e.g., 1 NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, THE NFTC FOREIGN
INCOME PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 3 n.3 (2001)
[hereinafter NFTC, FOREIGN INCOME PROJECT].
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tional TEA. This role was suggested in the following observation by
Surrey and his frequent co-author, Professor Paul McDaniel: "Most
tax expenditures are readily recognizable since they are usually
treated by their supporters as tax incentives or as hardship relief, and
they are not urged as necessary to correct defects in the income tax
structure itself."66
In other words, Professor McIntyre's rhetorical approach can
serve as a useful analytical shortcut. Where an income tax provision is,
in fact, promoted or defended on the basis of its subsidy or incentive
effects, the provision could be automatically classified as a tax expen-
67diture, thus triggering cost/benefit analysis, without the necessity of
doing a deeper examination using the SHS baseline. Stated differ-
ently, Professor McIntyre's rhetorical baseline is useful as a sufficient,
but not indispensible, indicium of tax expenditure status. Defenders of
a provision that acquires a tax expenditure classification under the
rhetorical approach could then attempt to escape that result by doing
a full analysis under the SHS baseline but the onus would be on those
defenders.
B. The Fiekowsky-Treasury Joint Committee Staff Approach
In 1980, Seymour Fiekowsky, the then Assistant Director of the
U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis, argued that Sur-
rey's version of TEA created problems for budget analysts in properly
structuring the accounts of the federal fiscal budget.6 He proposed to
solve this budget organization problem by redefining the tax expendi-
ture concept. His approach was to discard the SHS baseline and, in-
stead, limit tax expenditures to those provisions of tax law that satis-
fied both of the following criteria:
6 Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current
Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REv. 225, 228 (1979) (emphasis
added).
The principal purpose of TEA is to trigger a rigorous cost/benefit analysis of
tax provisions that are classified as tax expenditures. See Fleming & Peroni, supra
note 8, at 487-89; see also Meg Shreve, Conversations: Thomas Barthold, 123 TAX
NoTEs 1532, 1533 (June 29, 2009) (quoting Thomas Barthold, Chief of Staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation: "When our staff prepares background materials for
committee hearings, it's often a discussion of how much does this cost, what are the
distributional consequences, are there alternatives, what are the economic effects?
That's really what a tax expenditure analysis is about.").
6 See Seymour Fiekowsky, The Relation of Tax Expenditures to the Distribution
of the 'Fiscal Burden,' 2 CAN. TAX'N 211, 215-19 (1980).
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(1) Absent the particular provision, does the existing tax
law provide a general rule by which the results of the transac-
tion would determine the transactor's tax liability? Put an-
other way, is the specific tax provision inconsistent with the
basic structure of the tax law, be it a user charge or a general
revenue source like an excise or income tax?
(2) If the answer to question (1) is affirmative, is it possible
to formulate an expenditure program administrable by a cog-
nizant government agency that would achieve the same objec-
tive at equal, higher or lower budgetary cost?69
Fiekowsky was primarily concerned with the analysis and prepa-
ration of the federal budget presentation and his proposal was focused
on those matters rather than on tax policy. However, others saw a tax
policy application for Fiekowsky's work and, in 1983, the Treasury
Department began using Fiekowsky's two-part test as the baseline for
an alternative tax expenditure list that appears in the administration's
annual budget presentation as a companion to the SHS baseline list.70
The name given to the approach derived from Fiekowsky's test is the
"reference law baseline" and Treasury has continued to use it for pur-
poses of preparing its alternative tax expenditure list.71
69 Id. at 215.
7o See Full Text of Special Analysis G on Tax Expenditures, 85 TNT 26-4 (Feb. 5,
1985); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17, at 42.
The Treasury Department prepares the tax expenditure lists that are included in the
Administration's annual budget presentation. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 2010 ESTIMATES, supra note 15, at 1.
71 Another commentator, Victor Thuronyi, also saw tax policy implications in
Fiekowsky's work. In Thuronyi's view, TEA's chief purposes are "[1] to facilitate the
replacement of tax expenditures with non-tax-based programs and [21 to guide budg-
etary choices between tax-based and non-tax-based assistance." Victor Thuronyi, Tax
Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155, 1186 (1988). To carry out the
first function, Thuronyi proposed that TEA be applied in two steps: "(1) indentifying
a provision's significant purposes, and (2) determining whether a nontax program can
serve those purposes at least as well." Id. at 1187. This is effectively the adoption of
the second part of Fiekowsky's two-part test. See supra notes 68-69 and accompany-
ing text. However, Thuronyi argued that TEA should also be used to identify "tax
provisions that, even if not reasonably replaceable with direct spending programs,
provide support similar to that provided through non-tax-based subsidies." Thuronyi,
supra, at 1196. Moreover, he specified that for this latter purpose, the traditional defi-
nition of tax expenditures should be used. See id. Thus, Thuronyi's proposal turned
out to be an acceptance of the SHS baseline with a refinement to identify a subset of
tax expenditures that are replaceable with direct spending programs. Arguably, Sur-
rey's version of TEA accomplished this refinement by applying cost/benefit analysis
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Before 2008, however, the Joint Committee Staff steadily adhered
to the SHS definition as the sole baseline when preparing its annual
tax expenditure lists. Then in 2008, the Staff announced a "new para-
digm for classifying tax provisions as tax expenditures,"72 which it
abandoned in 2010 in favor of a return to the SHS baseline. This new
approach, even though short-lived, has considerable significance for
tax policy and theory because it expressly renounced the SHS baseline
on the ground that the attacks against it had mired TEA in contro-
versy and undermined its effectiveness. Instead, the Staff stated that
it would henceforth identify tax expenditures by employing two sepa-
rate categories. The first was "tax subsidies" and the second was "tax-
induced structural distortions."74
To give content to its first category - tax subsidies - the Staff
defined a "tax subsidy" as "a specific tax provision that is deliberately
inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the present tax law ...
and that collects less revenue than does the general rule."75 This is, of
course, largely indistinguishable from part one of the two-part test
that was first developed by Fiekowsky and then adopted by Treasury
76
as the reference law baseline. The Joint Committee Staff gave con-
tent to its second category - tax-induced structural distortions - by
relying on an economic efficiency analysis.
In Part III, we examine the Joint Committee Staff's 2008-2010
"new paradigm" and its two categories in detail.
to provisions that are identified as tax expenditures.
72 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17, at 1.
7 See id. at 39.
74 See id. at 39-42. Professor Daniel Shaviro has also proposed a two-category
approach to TEA. He would draw a distinction between tax rules that distribute the
tax burden in accordance with equitable principles, such as ability-to-pay, and tax
rules that have no substantial burden-distributing purpose but, instead, serve to pro-
vide benefits to particular groups or activities. Only the latter, he argues, are tax ex-
penditures. See Shaviro, Rethinking, supra note 12, at 188-89, 207-13. Arguably, Sur-
rey's version of TEA does this by treating income tax provisions as non-tax
expenditures if they are consistent with the SHS definition of income, which is princi-
pally based on the equitable concept of ability-to-pay. Moreover, Professor Shaviro
seems to concede that his proposed dichotomy has no more precision than the Surrey
approach. See id. at 213.
7 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17, at
39.
76 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. The Joint Committee Staff ex-
plicitly pointed out the congruence of its definition and Fiekowsky's work. See STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17, at 39-40.
n See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17,
at 10 n.19, 41.
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III. CRITIQUE OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE STAFF'S NEW PARADIGM
As previously noted, the Joint Committee Staff's 2008 TEA re-
port and its 2010 return to the SHS baseline are of major significance
because the Staff is arguably the most important body of non-partisan
experts involved in the federal tax policy process. Moreover, the 2008
report provides one of the strongest endorsements of TEA by a gov-
78
ernment agency in many years.
While we applaud the Joint Committee Staff's efforts in produc-
ing this report and trying to develop a new approach to TEA, we will
argue in this Part III that the 2008 report ultimately failed in its pri-
mary goal of avoiding controversy and that the version of TEA ad-
vanced in the report had characteristics that gave cause for serious
concern. Specifically, we will explain that the Joint Committee Staff's
"new" approach would not have avoided contention over the baseline
to be used in TEA analysis. Moreover, we will present the case that
the Joint Committee Staff's new approach had important defects that
could be overcome only by forthrightly grounding TEA in a norma-
tive baseline that is linked to the ability-to-pay and neutrality princi-
ples and that requires tax expenditures to be scrutinized under a form
of cost/benefit analysis that includes considerations of administrabil-
ity, complexity, and fairness.
A. Choice of a Baseline: The Joint Committee Staffs Approach
Versus SHS and Ability-to-Pay"
As noted in Part I of this article, TEA has been a lightning rod for
intense criticism. In response, the Joint Committee Staff attempted to
circumvent the critics by presenting an approach to TEA that would
hopefully make some of the important condemnations irrelevant. In
particular, the 2008 report attempted to respond to what the Joint
78 See id. at 6-7. For a prior governmental report that supports greater use of
TEA, see GAO, FEDERAL COMMITMENT, supra note 20. For prior documents by gov-
ernmental officials or governmental bodies that criticize TEA, see Foster Letter, su-
pra note 20, at 83 (criticizing GAO report that calls for reexamination of TEA so that
it may be more effectively used); STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., REVIEW, supra note
22 (strongly criticizing TEA as inconsistent with the view that income belongs to tax-
payers and that tax liability is determined through the democratic process).
7 A significant portion of Part III.A. of this article, infra notes 89-119 and ac-
companying text, is drawn in large part from our earlier article, Reinvigorating Tax
Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimension, which first appeared in 27 VA.
TAx REV. 437, 450-61 (2008).
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Committee Staff labeled "the most important consensus objections."a
According to the Staff, these objections are: first, that "it is not possi-
ble to identify in a neutral manner the terms of the 'normal' tax [i.e.,
SHS] to which present law should be compared,"' and, second, that
many critics of TEA
believe that the 'normal' tax has been fashioned, not simply
to serve as the baseline from which to identify tax expendi-
tures, but also to advocate the adoption of that 'normal' tax
into law, by presenting it as an aspirational but achievable tax
system that is superior to the current Internal Revenue
Code.82
In our judgment, the Staff's approach in the 2008 report does not
succeed in sidestepping these criticisms and, in addition, introduces
problems of its own. More importantly, when the criticisms noted by
the Staff are addressed head on, they do not withstand scrutiny and,
therefore, do not require a replacement for the SHS baseline.
As noted in Part II, the Joint Committee Staff's 2008-2010 ap-
proach attempted to uncouple TEA from SHS by dividing tax expen-
ditures into "tax subsidies" and "tax-induced structural distortions."
Nevertheless, the first of the Staff's categories, tax subsidies, did re-
quire a baseline, just not the SHS baseline. The substitute baseline for
identifying items in the tax subsidies category was described by the
Staff as those tax provisions that are "deliberately inconsistent with an
identifiable general rule of the present tax law ... and that [collect]
less revenue than does the general rule."8 3 This baseline is comparable
to the current law reference tax baseline that is used as an alternative
approach in the tax expenditure budgets produced by the Treasury.8"
In our judgment, however, this baseline is problematic because it has
the unfortunate effect of creating traction for the preservation of du-
bious Code provisions by giving them normative status where they
have managed to become "an identifiably general rule of the present
tax law."85 Additionally, this baseline creates the possibility of a one-
0 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17, at 9.
8' Id. at 9.
82 Id.
Id. at 39.
84 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2009 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 17, at 288, 296-97, 315-17.
8 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17,
at 9. Examples are expensing for small businesses, accelerated depreciation, corporate
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way ratchet in which the success of interest groups in getting large tax
expenditures into the Code can result in those tax expenditures gain-
86ing normative status.
By contrast to the Joint Committee Staff's baseline for identifying
tax subsidies, Surrey peremptorily declared that the proper baseline is
the SHS definition of income,87 modified to incorporate widely ac-
cepted business accounting standards and the generally accepted
structure of an income tax.8 We basically agree with Surrey that this is
the appropriate baseline to use in TEA and we believe that this base-
line is superior to the baseline adopted by the Joint Committee Staff
in its 2008 report. In our view, however, an understanding of this nor-
mative SHS baseline for TEA requires a brief explanation of a more
fundamental concept - the principle of ability-to-pay.
The parameters of a normatively correct income tax base are usu-
ally determined by applying an array of widely accepted tax policy cri-
teria.8 One of the most important of these criteria is the proposition
that the income tax burden should be allocated among resident tax-
payers in relation to their taxpaying capacities, often referred to as the
principle of ability-to-pay.90 Indeed, it is appropriate to regard this
tax rates below the top rate in the section 11 rate table, deferral of foreign-source in-
come earned by U.S. residents through foreign corporations, and exclusion of public
assistance benefits. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2009 ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17, at 288-91.
A possible example is the section 199 deduction with respect to domestic pro-
duction activities. In that regard, see the following by the Office of Management and
Budget:
To the extent [the deduction for domestic production activitiesi is viewed as
a tax break for certain qualifying businesses ("manufacturers"), it would be
a tax expenditure. In contrast, the deduction may prove to be so broad that
it is available to most U.S. businesses, in which case it might not be seen as
a tax expenditure. Rather, it would then represent a feature of the baseline
tax rate system because the deduction is equivalent to a lower tax rate. In
addition, it might not be a tax expenditure to the extent it is viewed as pro-
viding relief from the double tax on corporate profits.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2009 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17,
at 317. For our criticism of this analysis, see Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8, at
499-500; see also infra note 130 and accompanying text.
8 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 7, at 3-4.
8 See id. at 4; Thuronyi, supra note 71.
See JOSEPH M. DODGE, J. CLIFTON FLEMING, JR. & DEBORAH A. GEIER,
FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY 117-50 (3d ed. 2004).
9 See Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by Pro-
fessors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Nations Doc.
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longstanding concept with its lengthy intellectual history9 as the major
fairness norm in the U.S. federal income tax system.9
E.F.S. 73.F.19., at 18 (1923), reprinted in 4 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 4003, 4022 (1962); U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 33, at 1, 24; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH
H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 28, 38-39 (6th ed. 2009); WILLIAM A.
KLEIN, JOSEPH BANKMAN, DANIEL N. SHAVIRO & KIRK J. STARK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 11-12 (15th ed. 2009); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE,
PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 232-40 (4th ed. 1984); RICHARD
SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 21-22 (2d ed.
2007); STEPHEN G. UTz, TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE
PRINCIPAL DEBATES 31-32, 41 (1993); Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based
Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 29
(1993); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing
the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 72-80 (1998); Robert L.
Palmer, Toward Unilateral Coherence in Determining Jurisdiction to Tax Income, 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 9-10 (1989); Donald Phares, Tax Equity Analysis, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 399 (Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D.
Ebel & Jane G. Gravelle eds., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]; Joseph T.
Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 574-80
(1965); see also U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY,
OTA PAPER No. 85, at 6 (1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/
tax-policy/library/ota85.pdf [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, DISTRIBUTIONAL
ANALYSIS]. For a discussion of the use of fairness considerations in defining income,
see Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45 (1990).
Adam Smith endorsed the ability-to-pay principle as a foundational tax norm,
although, failing to understand that it differed from the benefit principle, he conflated
the two. See Richard A. Musgrave, Fairness in Taxation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 90, at 135. Smith's statement was: "The subjects of every state ought to contrib-
ute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to
their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively
enjoy under the protection of the state." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 371 (4th ed. 1850). Kant also rec-
ognized the ability-to-pay principle as a norm of taxation. Like Smith, he conflated it
with the benefit principle but he also clearly acknowledged the redistributional impli-
cations of the ability-to-pay principle. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 101 (Mary Gregor ed., 1996). More recent commentators on taxation have
recognized that the ability-to-pay and benefit principles are separate norms. See, e.g.,
LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 16-30 (2002); Deborah
A. Geier, Time to Bring Back the Benefit Norm?, 102 TAX NOTES 1155 (Mar. 1, 2004);
Sagit Leviner, From Deontology to Practical Application: The Vision of a Good Soci-
ety and the Tax System, 26 VA. TAX REV. 405, 423-30 (2006).
See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 33, at 1; C. EUGENE
STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 10 (2004) [hereinafter STEUERLE,
CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY]. For discussion of the history of the rise of the ability-
to-pay concept as a foundational principle in U.S. tax policy, see RICHARD J. JOSEPH,
THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN INCOME TAX: THE REVENUE ACT OF 1894 AND ITS
AFTERMATH 89-90, 95-96 (2004); Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern Ameri-
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Nevertheless, the ability-to-pay concept has drawn sharp criticism
because its meaning can be controversial at the margins. For example,
commentators often refine the ability-to-pay fairness concept by sub-
dividing it into a horizontal equity component (taxpayers with equal
incomes should pay equal amounts of tax) and a vertical equity com-
ponent (taxpayers with unequal incomes should pay amounts of tax
which are sufficiently unequal to fairly reflect the differences in their
incomes).93 Other commentators, however, have criticized these re-
finements by asserting that horizontal equity has no significance as a
tax policy norm separate from vertical equity or that neither horizon-
tal nor vertical equity has any content that is independent of more
general notions regarding fundamental fairness.94 There has also been
understandable disagreement regarding certain nuances of the ability-
to-pay concept, such as the proper handling of psychic income, leisure,
underachievement, and various personal characteristics of taxpayers. 95
can Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists and the Intellectual Foundations of the
U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793 (2005); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Equity versus
Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in Historical Perspective, in TAX JUSTICE: THE
ONGOING DEBATE 25 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002).
Ability-to-pay is a foundational principle in the income tax systems of many
other countries as well. See Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxa-
tion as Constitutional Principles: Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 FLA.
TAX REV. 259, 304 (2006); Frans Vanistendael, Legal Framework for Taxation, in 1
TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 15, 22-23 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996). The ability-
to-pay principle has even been made a constitutional limitation on the power to tax in
Italy, Spain, and Germany. See Vanistendael, supra; cf Basic Facts About the United
Nations, The United Nations: Organization, http://www.un.org/aboutun/
untoday/unorg.htm ("The fundamental criterion on which the scale of assessments is
based is the capacity of countries to pay.") (last visited July 2, 2010).
9 See DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 150-53 (1986);
JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAx 88 (1989); GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 90,
at 28-29; WILLIAM A. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7
(1976); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39,
86-98 (1996).
See generally Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical
Equity: The MusgravelKaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAx REV. 607 (1993); Louis Kaplow,
A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992); Richard A. Musgrave,
Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354 (1993); Louis Kaplow, Hori-
zontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT'LTAX J. 139 (1989); Richard
A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1990). But see Jo-
seph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and
Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 TAX L. REV. 399, 458-59 (2005) [hereinafter Dodge,
Theories].
9s See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., REPORT RELATING
TO THE IMPACT ON INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 107-17 (Joint Comm. Print 1997); Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L.
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Finally, ability-to-pay analysis has been criticized for focusing on taxa-
tion without considering the distributional effects of government ex-
96penditures and for using the prevailing distribution of income as the
measure of taxpaying capacity without inquiring into whether that in-
come distribution is itself fair.9 As noted, these points have caused
some commentators to dismiss the ability-to-pay concept as unhelp-
ful. 98
In our view, these criticisms greatly undervalue the importance of
the ability-to-pay principle in establishing the general structure and
content of the federal tax base. This useful role plus the intuitive ap-
peal99 of the ability-to-pay principle has caused it to persist as a major
REV. 1191 (2008); Zolt, supra note 93, at 89-101; see also Barbara H. Fried, The Puz-
zling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAPMAN L. REV. 157, 182-83 (1999). These
strike us as peripheral matters that do not undercut the basic utility of the ability-to-
pay principle.
96 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 91, at 24-25, 30, 184; Marvin A. Chirelstein
& Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Increases, Revenue Effects, Efficiency, and Income Ine-
quality, 128 TAX NOTES 197, 201-02 (July 12, 2010); Fried, supra note 95, at 182. In
our view, an unfairly distributed tax burden is problematic, even in the unlikely case
in which tax inequity is completely corrected by redistributional spending. This is be-
cause even perfectly redistributional spending is unlikely to overcome the taxpayer
resentment, and consequent negative effect on tax compliance and respect for law
generally, that results from a facially unfair tax burden distribution. See also Dodge,
Theories, supra note 94, at 451-52, 456-57.
97 See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 91, at 28-30; Fried, supra note 95, at 182.
This criticism overlooks the fact that the ability-to-pay concept is a tax burden distri-
bution norm, not an income distribution norm. To demand that the ability-to-pay
concept provide a normative basis for both tax burden distribution and income distri-
bution is to demand too much. A separate income distribution norm is required. See
also Dodge, Theories, supra note 94, at 454 ("[Tjhe point of the ability-to-pay princi-
ple is precisely that a tax base keyed to market outcomes is the only rational founda-
tion for a system of redistribution that would alter such outcomes. Existing distribu-
tions . . . have no normative status whatsoever under the objective ability-to-pay tax
justice norm.").
9 See, e.g., Louis EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 56 (1961) ("To
speak forcefully of ability to pay is merely to indulge in evasive rhetoric."); MURPHY
& NAGEL, supra note 91, at 30 ("[T]he vague idea of 'ability to pay' will not help us
when we move to the different question of what distributive aims a just government
should have."); SLEMROD & BAKIJA,supra note 63, at 66 ("[O]n the compelling ques-
tions of the day, - such as whether millionaires ought to remit 70 percent, 50 percent,
or 30 percent of their income in tax or whether poor families should bear any tax bur-
den at all - the ability-to-pay principle has nothing concrete to offer."); Alvin War-
ren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax? 89 YALE L.J. 1081,
1092-93 (1980) ("Such definitions reduce to statements that society should appropri-
ately tax what it should appropriately tax.").
9 Regarding the intuitive appeal of the ability-to-pay principle, Professor Dodge
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parameter of tax policy.'oo Thus, a prominent tax economist has re-
cently referred to the horizontal equity component of ability-to-pay as
"perhaps the queen of all principles affecting government policy."'o
Ultimately, the decision to use the ability-to-pay concept as a founda-
tional principle of the tax system is based on a societal decision that
other approaches are inferior.102
More importantly, the preceding controversies and criticisms have
been made effectively irrelevant by the development of a U.S. tax pol-
icy consensus under which the ability-to-pay concept means that tax-
payers with larger net incomes in a given year should generally pay
more tax (calculated with progressive rates) than those who have
smaller net incomes in the same year,' and that when comparing net
has observed:
[T~he ability-to-pay principle can be constructed from a preference-neutral
Rawls-type contractarian method: A person in ignorance of his or her ma-
terial station in life (and moderately risk-averse) would opt to be forced to
contribute to government according to the ability-to-pay principle (so long,
of course, as everybody else is subject to the same taxing principle).
Dodge, Theories, supra note 94, at 460. Consistent with this view, William Safire,
the conservative New York Times political editor, said: "Most of us accept as
'fair' this principle: the poor should pay nothing, the middlers something, the
rich the highest percentage." William Safire, The 25% Solution, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1995, at A23, quoted in MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX:
WHAT IT Is, How IT GOT THAT WAY, AND WHERE WE Go FROM HERE 11 (1999)
[hereinafter GRAETZ, THE U.S. INCOME TAX]. Professor Schmalbeck reached
the same conclusion as Safire. Richard L. Schmalbeck, Race and the Federal In-
come Tax: Has a Disparate Impact Case Been Made?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1817, 1820
(1998).
100 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 33, at 1; STEUERLE,
CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 92, at 10.
0 See STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 92, at 10
("[H]orizontal equity . .. asserts that those with equal ability to pay should pay equal
taxes.... Horizontal equity is perhaps the queen of all principles affecting govern-
ment policy .... ); see also Gene Steuerle, A Consensus Base for Tax Reform, 113
TAX NOTES 371 (Oct. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Steuerle, Consensus].
1 See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (2006); Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 98, at 202.
10 See, e.g., TESTIMONY BEFORE THE U.S. S. FIN. COMM. OF ROBERT J. CARROLL,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SEC'Y (TAX ANALYSIS), U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, at 3 (2006), available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/carrolltestimony%209.20.06.pdf
[hereinafter CARROLL TESTIMONY] ("[T]he tax system should be appropriately
progressive."); PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM,
PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 49 ("All members of the Panel endorsed the goal of a
progressive tax structure."); Thomas L. Hungerford, Tax Expenditures: Good, Bad or
Ugly?, 113 TAX NOTES 325, 329 (Oct. 23, 2006) ("[A]bout two-thirds of Americans
160
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incomes for this purpose, the realization principle is applied,'4 an ob-
jective, market-based standard is used,10 and items that cannot be fea-
sibly measured (e.g., leisure, psychic income, and forgone opportuni-
ties) generally are omitted from the tax base. 106 The emergence of this
NOTES 325, 329 (Oct. 23, 2006) ("[A]bout two-thirds of Americans believe 'that peo-
ple with high incomes should pay a larger share of their income in taxes than those
with lower income."'); Theodore P. Seto & Sandi L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Abil-
ity-to-Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1057 (2006)
("[Sitandard tax theory largely ignores differences - other than differences in 'in-
come' - in the ability of taxpayers to pay taxes."). On a related matter, the Pew Re-
search Center for the People and the Press conducted a series of national polls of
adult Americans showing that from 1994 to 2007, agreement with the statement that it
is the government's responsibility "to take care of people who can't take care of
themselves" increased from 57% to 69% and agreement that the government should
assist the needy even if doing so causes an increase in government debt rose from
41% to 54%. See PEW RES. CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, TRENDS IN
POLITICAL VALUES AND CORE ATTITUDES: 1987-2007 (2007), available at
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/312.pdf. For an article that analyzes the moral,
economic, and administrative effects of a progressive rate structure, see Joseph
Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at
Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905 (1987).
104 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 33, at 46-47; William D. An-
drews, A Consumption- Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV.
1113, 1141-48 (1974); Christopher H. Hanna, Tax Theories and Tax Reform, 59 SMU
L. REV. 435, 437-38 (2006); Ronald A. Pearlman, A Tax Reform Caveat: In the Real
World, There Is No Perfect Tax System, in TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM
106, 108-09 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett eds., 2005); Deborah H. Schenk,
A Positive Account of the Realization Principle, 57 TAX L. REV. 355, 396 (2004).
1o5 See SIMONS, supra note 36, at 50-51; Dodge, Theories, supra note 94, at 449;
see also KLEIN, supra note 93, at 7 ("On balance, the case for objectivity .. . has car-
ried the day with respect to the tax system. But, again, it is useful to keep in mind that
by opting for objectivity, we have simultaneously decided to settle for a less-than-
perfect measure of ability.").
1o6 See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS, supra note 33, at 3, 159-62; 1 U.S.
TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 14-
15, 37-42 (1984) [hereinafter U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM]; WALTER J. BLUM &
HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 64 (1953);
BRADFORD, supra note 93, at 16-19, 155-56; KLEIN, BANKMAN, SHAVIRO & STARK,
supra note 90, at 81-82; Dodge, Theories, supra note 94, at 449-50; Vada Waters
Lindsey, The Widening Gap Under the Internal Revenue Code: The Need for Renewed
Progressivity, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 3, 7-8, 39-40 (2001); Herbert A. Stein, What's
Wrong with the Federal Tax System, in 1 COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM 107, 110-14 (Comm. Print 1959); see also PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 30 (The
Treasury Department calculates ability-to-pay in terms of "wages and salaries, busi-
ness or farm net income, taxable and tax-exempt interest, dividends, rental income,
realized capital gains, cash transfers from the government, and retirement benefits.").
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consensus has made the ability-to-pay principle a workable concept
*107despite the various uncertainties and controversies at the margins.
Integrally related to the ability-to-pay principle is the widely ac-
cepted Schanz-Haig-Simons (SHS) definition of income, which pro-
vides that an individual's income is the sum of his or her consumption
and realized changes in wealth' during the taxable period (typically a
year).'0 Under this definition, both amounts that are consumed and
amounts that are saved are included in the tax base.o Obviously, this
is a way of describing an individual's taxpaying ability."' Thus, SHS is
generally understood to be based on the ability-to-pay principle and
as a formula for implementing that principle.112
"" For recent vigorous defenses of the ability-to-pay principle, see Dodge, Theo-
ries, supra note 94, at 449-61; Seto & Buhai, supra note 103.
108 The realization doctrine is arguably embedded in the SHS definition of in-
come because Henry Simons argued that this doctrine is an inherent feature of a
workable income tax. See SIMONs, supra note 36, at 100, 207-08. From this standpoint,
the realization doctrine is not a tax expenditure. But even if it is a tax expenditure, it
is a justifiable tax expenditure under cost/benefit analysis because of the administra-
tive problems associated with taxing unrealized gains and allowing deductions for un-
realized losses. See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8, at 444-45, 458, 487-88 (explaining
why a tax expenditure is acceptable if concerns regarding enforceability, administra-
bility, economic efficiency, simplification, and/or governmental effectiveness cause it
to get a passing grade under cost/benefit analysis).
109 See JOSHUA D. ROSENBERG & DOMINIC L. DAHER, THE LAW OF FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 19 (2008) ("The most widely accepted definitions of income are
those of Professors Haig and Simons."); Hanna, supra note 104, at 436 ("The Haig-
Simons definition of income is generally considered by most tax scholars to be the
ideal definition of income."); see also 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS 3-2 (3d ed. 1999) ("Among
contemporary American economists, the so-called Haig-Simons definition of 'income'
is the most widely accepted . . . "); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 63, at 28.
no See SIMONS, supra note 36, at 50.
uI Indeed, Simons characterized the SHS definition as a "measure of the indi-
vidual's prosperity." Id. at 206; see also Warren, supra note 98, at 1085-86 ("The ar-
ithmetical process of the Haig-Simons definition should not, however, obscure the na-
ture of the aggregate tax base, which is the product of the society's private capital and
labor for the accounting period. The Haig-Simons calculation simply identifies how
much of that product has ended up in each taxable unit.").
112 SHS is principally based on the ability-to-pay concept. See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 33, at 31; U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS,
supra note 90, at 7; Andrews, Personal Deductions, supra note 29, at 326-329; Dodge,
Theories, supra note 94, at 450; see also Joseph M. Dodge, What's Wrong with Carry-
over Basis Under H.R. 8, 91 TAX NOTES 961, 971 (May 7, 2001) (suggesting that the
assignment-of-income doctrine, a core principle of the U.S. federal income tax, may
be based on the ability-to-pay concept). Consistent with the principle of ability-to-
pay, the consumption element of SHS is measured in objective, market-based terms.
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Not surprisingly, the theoretical criticisms leveled at the ability-to-
pay principle with regard to the lack of clarity at the margins or the
failure to include certain items"' have also been directed at SHS. Be-
cause the U.S. tax policy consensus accepts ability-to-pay as a worka-
ble concept despite these objections, that same consensus has also
114
embraced SHS as a practical policy guide.
To be sure, the SHS concept has not prevented the income tax
from acquiring a mass of incoherent and inefficient special interest
provisions."' Moreover, SHS is not the exclusive criterion of good tax
policy. It must be weighed against other important criteria such as en-
forceability, administrability, economic efficiency, simplification,
revenue yield, and governmental effectiveness. Nevertheless, the SHS
definition does provide a principled structure that is useful for testing
the efficacy of tax provisions and opposing ill-advised tax policy
moves in the context of an income tax base, which is the predominant
underlying base of the federal income tax system.
A second major tax policy principle is that, to the greatest extent
possible, tax provisions should achieve neutrality - i.e., taxpayer be-
havior should be altered as little as possible from what it would be in
the absence of a particular tax provision.116 Incentives and subsidies,
including tax expenditures, enhance the after-tax economic returns
from affected activities and cause taxpayers to engage in those activi-
ties to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case, distorting
taxpayer behavior and interfering with the free market's allocation of
See Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and the
Measurement of Taxable Consumption, 45 TAx L. REV. 215, 223-24 (1990).
113 See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8, at 442-55; see also Infanti, supra note 95.
114 See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 63, at 31 ("[A]s long as we are operating
an income tax, it is important to understand how the tax system's definition of income
compares to a reasonable conceptual measure of income."); Hanna, supra note 104, at
448-49; Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under An Ideal Income Tax, 43
TAX L. REV. 679, 683 (1988) ("[The SHS] definition has become the generally ac-
cepted foundation for modern day, normative analysis of the meaning of income as a
base for personal taxation."). But see Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base"
as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Douglas A. Kahn,
Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net
Income?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1979).
1 See Steuerle, Consensus, supra note 101, at 372 ("What has essentially hap-
pened to the tax policy process in recent decades is that it has increasingly adopted
many of the bad habits of the expenditure policy process."); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, Su-
pra note 63, at 32-55.
11 See 1 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 106, at 13; SLEMROD &
BAKIJA, supra note 63, at 131-34.
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resources. 17 Professor Walter Blum stated this point as follows:
A more classical line of attack on special dispensations under
the income tax is that they cause a misallocation of economic
resources. By taxing (and thus penalizing) certain activities
less than others, the preferential provisions - so the argu-
ment goes - cause more resources to flow into these endeav-
ors than would be attracted if the tax system were perfectly
neutral, and as a result scarce resources are utilized in less
productive combinations. I concur in the soundness of this
*118
reasoning.
Before aspects of the tax system that are not neutral can be evalu-
ated and addressed, however, they must first be identified; a focused
analytical tool is highly useful for that purpose. TEA serves this end
with respect to incentives and subsidies delivered through income tax
provisions. Stated differently, TEA is a device for identifying features
of the tax system that cause taxpayers to pursue certain activities more
extensively than they otherwise would."9 Thus, a legitimate concern
for neutrality in the tax system drives the use of TEA as a tool of
sound tax policy.
Accordingly, in our view, the proper baseline for TEA is an in-
come tax generally based on the ability-to-pay, SHS, and neutrality
concepts. In its 2008 report, the Joint Committee Staff adopted a dif-
ferent baseline for the purpose of identifying tax subsidies. It was a
reference tax baseline, which we believe to be less principled and co-
herent than an SHS baseline grounded in ability-to-pay and neutrality
principles. Moreover, as we explain in Part III.B., the reference tax
baseline used by the Joint Committee Staff in 2008-2010, although
well-meaning to be sure, gave too much deference to bad tax policy
117 See CARROLL TESTIMONY, supra note 103, at 3; GAO, FEDERAL
COMMITMENT, supra note 20, at 49-50; PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL
TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 70-72; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note
63, at 218; Eric J. Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending - Does it Make a Difference?, 53
NAT'L TAX J. 361, 362 (2000).
"" Walter J. Blum, Tax Policy and Preferential Provisions in the Income Tax
Base, in 1 COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 77, 82 (Comm.
Print 1959); see also Communication from the Commission to the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Dividend Taxa-
tion of Individuals in the Internal Market, at 17-19, COM (2003) 810 final (Dec. 19,
2003); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Tax Incentives and Economists, 111
TAX NOTES 20, 23 (Apr. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Sullivan, Tax Incentives].
"9 See Shaviro, Rethinking, supra note 12, at 204.
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that had already made its way into Code. The differences between us
and the Joint Committee Staff on this point are not vast, however, at
least with respect to those tax expenditure provisions falling within
the tax subsidies category (as opposed to those falling within the tax-
induced structural distortions category).
B. The Joint Committee Staffs New Approach to Examining "Tax
Subsidies" and "Tax-Induced Structural Distortions" Would Not Have
Avoided Controversy or Criticism of TEA
As explained in Part I of this article, the Joint Committee Staff's
principal reason for abandoning the SHS baseline was to avoid criti-
cism and controversy. To the contrary, we believe that the Joint
Committee Staff's reference tax baseline would not have avoided con-
troversy and would have attracted vigorous attacks by TEA oppo-
nents. To a significant extent, this is because the "new" baseline was
expressly grounded in income tax principles. Indeed, the pertinent
portion of the 2008 report states: "[W]e recognize that our specific
implementation of tax expenditure analysis is firmly wedded to the
view that the current Internal Revenue Code is at heart an income
tax, because we employ that perspective when we attempt to identify
what are the Code's general rules . ... "120 This means that, notwith-
standing its stated goal of a value-neutral analysis and notwithstanding
that it seemed to reject the SHS baseline used by Surrey, the Joint
Committee Staff's 2008-2010 approach explicitly accepted income
taxation rather than consumption taxation as the baseline. This fur-
ther means that the Joint Committee Staff's tax-induced structural dis-
tortions analysis inevitably accepted the consumption/savings distor-
tion produced by an income tax, but not by a consumption tax, and
only focused on other distortions. Thus, the Staff's distortion analysis
would surely have been attacked by those who advocate tax expendi-
ture provisions that are based on consumption tax principles.
Moreover, to prevent their favorite subsidies from being scruti-
nized under rigorous cost/benefit analysis, all tax subsidy advocates
would certainly have attacked the Joint Committee Staff's baseline as
vigorously as they have attacked Surrey's baseline. Stated differently,
beneficiaries of subsidies and distortions abhor any form of
cost/benefit analysis and would have fought against the Joint Commit-
tee Staff's 2008-2010 version of TEA with as much determination as
they have fought against Surrey's original version. In doing so, the




TEA beneficiaries would have pressed the familiar objections to TEA
that the Joint Committee Staff attempted to outflank with its 2008-
2010 taxonomy of tax subsidies and tax-induced structural distortions.
For example, TEA beneficiaries would surely have made baseline-
oriented objections in the form of arguments that their preferences
are somehow consistent with one or more general rules of the current
Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, not properly classified as tax
subsidies. After all, a taxpayer facing the loss of a tax benefit is highly
motivated to find threads of consistency that others would discount.
In addition, there would have been heated debates in which the
beneficiaries of tax-induced structural distortions would have argued
that the distortions are facially justified by claims of countervailing
factors and that rigorous cost/benefit analysis should not be applied to
them. For example, the Joint Committee Staff's 2008-2010 approach
treated deferral of U.S. tax on the income of foreign subsidiaries as a
tax-induced structural distortion rather than a tax subsidy but would
presumably have subjected it to a cost/benefit analysis (although lim-
ited to economic efficiency concerns, as explained below in Part
III.C.) to examine whether deferral should be repealed (i.e., a full in-
clusion system adopted) or replaced with a territorial system. Many
U.S. corporations and their tax advisers, however, are opposed to ei-
ther repeal of deferral or adoption of a territorial system because the
present deferral system is more generous to taxpayers than either of
those alternatives.121 Thus, U.S. multinational corporations can be ex-
pected to resist any tax expenditure-based analysis of deferral, even
the limited version connected with the Joint Committee Staff's 2008-
2010 distortion-based approach. Defenders of deferral undoubtedly
would have argued that deferral is not a tax expenditure at alll22 and,
in any event, that deferral is conclusively justified by competitiveness
claims even though those claims are unsupported by rigorously tested
123
empirical evidence.
A related set of points can be made with respect to section 199.
When fully phased in, the section 199 deduction for nine percent of
"qualified production activities income" 124 will reduce the top rate on
121 See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than
Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009).
122 See Bartlett, supra note 19, at 416-17 (arguing that deferral is not a tax
expenditure); see also NORMAN TURE, TAXING FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME: THE
ECONOMIC AND EQUITY ISSUES 8-12 (Tax Foundation 1976) (arguing that deferral is
not a tax subsidy).
123 See, e.g., NFTC, FOREIGN INCOME PROJEct, supra note 65.
124 I.R.C. § 199(a)(1)(A).
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that income from 35 percent to approximately 32 percent in the opti-
125
mal scenario. This provision was enacted in 2004, not for the pur-
pose of more accurately defining income, but expressly to "make in-
vestments in domestic manufacturing facilities more attractive"1 26 and
to "assist in the creation and preservation of U.S. manufacturing
jobs." 27 This purpose would seem to indisputably label section 199 as
a tax subsidy under the Joint Committee Staff's 2008-2010 approach'28
and require it to be subjected to full cost/benefit scrutiny, including an
examination of its distortive effects, its revenue cost, its complexity
costs, whether its broad definition of production makes it poorly tar-
geted, the extent to which it actually creates or preserves jobs, and the
benefit to the economy from creating or preserving those otherwise
non-competitive jobs.
Nevertheless, in its 2008 budget document, the Bush Administra-
tion made the following argument:
[T]he deduction may prove to be so broad that it is available
to most U.S. businesses, in which case it might not be seen as
a tax expenditure. Rather it would then represent a feature of
the baseline tax rate system because the deduction is equiva-
129lent to a lower tax rate.
In other words, the Bush Administration argued that this provision,
enacted for a clear tax expenditure purpose, was likely to morph into
a general rule of the baseline system, which would cause it to shed its
tax subsidy status under the Joint Committee Staff's 2008-2010 ap-
proach and thereby escape full cost/benefit scrutiny.
We disagree with this characterization of the section 199 deduc-
tion. The type of income that qualifies for the deduction is, indeed, de-
fined very broadly to include counter-intuitive items. 30 Nevertheless,
the service, retail, and financial sectors of the economy are largely ex-
cluded from section 199. In our judgment, this means that the scope of
section 199 is too narrow to allow it to qualify as a general rule; it
125 .35 - (.35 x .09) = .3185.
126 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF TAX LEGIS. ENACTED IN THE 108TH CONG., at 170 (Joint Comm. Print 2005).
127 Id.
128 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text; supra note 86.
129 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEAR 2008, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 315
(2007).
130 See I.R.C. § 199(c)(1), (c)(4).
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should be regarded as a tax expenditure and subjected to appropri-
ately rigorous cost/benefit analysis. But this example shows how the
Joint Committee Staff's decision to make current general law the
baseline for TEA purposes created an opening for characterizing du-
bious provisions as part of the baseline and, therefore, exempt from
full cost/benefit analysis that would have applied to the Joint Commit-
tee Staff's tax subsidy category.
These observations segue into a closely related point. If current
general law were the baseline for identifying tax subsidies, the result
would be a perverse incentive for making tax expenditures as broad as
possible, instead of carefully targeted, because the broader the tax ex-
penditure is, the better the chance that it can be passed off as a gen-
eral rule and therefore, not a tax subsidy at all. This would have had
the presumably unintended effect of actually increasing the fiscal
harm caused by tax expenditures and decreasing the effectiveness of
tax expenditures as a substitute for carefully targeted direct expendi-
ture programs.
An additional observation about the use of current general law as
the baseline is that this approach gives support to those who would
advocate new tax expenditures by arguing that they are not materially
different from old tax expenditures that have arguably grown into
general rules and, therefore, that a full cost/benefit analysis need not
be applied to the new tax expenditures. This, in turn, would lead to a
proliferation of tax expenditures in various areas, thus undercutting
the effectiveness of TEA as a device for helping control the growth of
tax expenditure provisions.
The preceding discussions of section 199, of the incentive to make
tax expenditures as broad as possible, and of the "it's-no-different-
from-an-existing-tax-expenditure" argument are critically important
because these discussions point out a slippery slope problem. The es-
sence of this problem is that although the Joint Committee Staff con-
cluded that only five major SHS baseline tax expenditures were re-
moved from tax subsidy classification by the 2008-2010 switch to the
reference law baseline,"3 the preceding analysis shows that the switch
would have opened the door to expansion of this difference through
the creation of new tax subsidies that would be tax expenditures under
the SHS baseline but not tax subsidies under the reference law base-
line.
Finally, note that the Joint Committee Staff's reference tax base-
131 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 2010 ESTIMATES, supra note 15, at 4
n.9.
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line was still a baseline that would have been used to identify many
tax provisions as "tax subsidies" that should be forced to undergo a
112presumably rigorous cost/benefit analysis. This means that the Joint
Committee Staff's 2008-2010 approach to TEA would have been used
by tax reformers as a policy tool for ridding the Code of tax provisions
that violated the reference tax baseline and were unable to survive the
TEA evaluation process. Thus, those who have criticized TEA for be-
ing a politically controversial tax reform instrument surely would have
also viewed the Joint Committee Staff's revised TEA approach as de-
fective because it would have been used to advocate the adoption of
Code changes that brought the current Code closer to the aspirational
but achievable reference tax baseline. Therefore, it would seem that
the Joint Committee Staff's new approach did not effectively over-
come one of the most important objections to TEA that the Staff
sought to neutralize with its 2008-2010 construct.
C. Additional Problems with the Joint Committee Staffs New
Category of Tax-Induced Structural Distortions
As noted previously, the Joint Committee Staff's 2008-2010 ap-
proach to TEA divided tax expenditures into two categories: tax sub-
sidies that are identified through application of a reference law base-
line and tax induced structural distortions. We have explained our
views regarding the inferiority of the reference law baseline in com-
parison to the SHS benchmark. We now turn to a further examination
of the Staff's second category of tax expenditure - tax-induced struc-
tural distortions - that was to be identified "by considering their eco-
nomic efficiency costs, not by invoking any normative tax system.""'s
In our view, this analytical approach had the unfortunate effect of ig-
noring the negative impact on the health of the tax system that these
"structural distortion" tax expenditures may cause by making the law
more difficult for the Internal Revenue Service (Service) to adminis-
ter and by eroding taxpayer voluntary compliance because of in-
creased complexity and unfairness.34 It also had the effect of ignoring
132 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17,
at 9 (stating that the Joint Committee Staff anticipated that the tax subsidies category
of its new TEA approach would "comprise the preponderance of items that today are
classified as tax expenditures").
133 Id. at 41; see also id. at 10 n.19.
134 The Joint Committee Staff's report explicitly stated that "[wihile tax expendi-
ture analysis can be helpful in identifying efficiency, equity and ease of administration
issues . .. our definition of Tax-Induced Structural Distortions looks only to the sub-
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tax fairness concerns in evaluating these types of tax provisions in the
Code. Stated differently, the Joint Committee Staff's approach might
have weakened the effectiveness of TEA, because, with respect to the
tax-induced structural distortions portion of its new approach, it
seemed to use a version of cost/benefit analysis that focuses only on
economic efficiency and eliminates equity concerns and concerns
about other negative effects (e.g., administrability) on the tax sys-
tem. By contrast, tax subsidies apparently were to be scrutinized un-
der a form of cost/benefit analysis that includes equity, administrabil-
ity, and other relevant factors in addition to economic efficiency. 1 We
see no sound reason for effectively applying a less rigorous form of
cost/benefit analysis by ignoring these other important tax policy con-
cerns when evaluating tax-induced structural distortions. Many tax-
induced structural distortions mentioned in the Joint Committee Staff
report (including the deferral privilege) raise serious equity and ad-
ministrability concerns that are seemingly ignored under the Joint
Committee Staff's 2008-2010 approach.
Moreover, despite the Joint Committee Staff's attempt to find
consensus on these issues, its approach to treating some tax expendi-
tures as "tax-induced structural distortions," subject to less rigorous
scrutiny than "tax subsidies," would not have avoided controversy.
Indeed, it would have spawned a new set of characterization contro-
versies. For example, as noted above, the Joint Committee Staff in its
2008 report treated the deferral of tax on income earned by a U.S.
corporation through a foreign subsidiary as a "tax-induced structural
distortion" but not a "tax subsidy" because deferral imposes substan-
tial efficiency costs but is not a deviation from any clearly identifiable
stantive criterion of efficiency." Id. at 42. For this purpose, the Joint Committee Staff
adopted the conventional definition of efficiency from economics: "A tax system is
perfectly efficient if individuals and firms make the same decisions in the presence of
the tax as they would if the tax did not exist, subject only to the fact that they are less
wealthy by virtue of paying the tax." Id. at 53.
135 See id. at 10 n.19, 41-42; Kleinbard, Framework Legislation, supra note 10, at
369 ("JCT contemplated that tax-induced structural distortions would be analyzed
solely under economic efficiency principles, and not from any normative perspec-
tive."). For another critique of the Joint Committee Staff's tax-induced structural dis-
tortions portion of its new 2008-2010 TEA approach, see Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Ex-
penditures and the Carbon Audit, 122 TAX NOTES 1367, 1371 (Mar. 16, 2009) ("Rather
than taking the breadth of its TISD [tax-induced structural distortions] definition se-
riously, the JCT seems to be using the TISD concept only selectively, largely as a way
of including ACRS in its tax expenditure budget despite the fact that ACRS is not a
tax subsidy under the reference tax base analysis.").
136 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17,
at 48-77.
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tax rule."' This meant that deferral would be subjected to a less-
demanding form of cost/benefit analysis than if it were a tax subsidy.
We and other commentators, however, would dispute this characteri-
zation of deferral and argue instead that deferral is an exception to
the general rule regarding the Code's treatment of business income
earned by a U.S. person. In our view, the general approach of the
U.S. income tax system is to impose current tax on business income
earned by a U.S. person, whether that income is earned through an
unincorporated branch, a sole proprietorship, a pass-through entity
(i.e., a partnership, a limited liability company taxed as a partnership
for federal income tax purposes, or an S corporation), or an entity
taxed as a C corporation for federal income tax purposes.139 Deferral
with respect to foreign-source income earned by U.S. persons through
a foreign corporation is a deviation from this general approach. Thus,
the deferral privilege is a significant departure from the current taxa-
tion of business income that generally prevails within the present in-
come tax system.40 Accordingly, we would argue that deferral should
have been treated as a "tax subsidy" under the Joint Committee
Staff's 2008-2010 TEA approach and subjected to the stronger version
of cost/benefit analysis that applied to tax subsidies. This illustrates
that the Staff's tax-induced structural distortions category actually
would have created new controversies rather than avoided disputes.
Presumably, the major purpose of the Joint Committee Staff's
"new" approach to TEA was to identify subsidies and tax distortions
that should be forced to undergo a rigorous cost/benefit analysis. The
Staff's purpose was to force advocates of particular expenditures to
defend their tax benefits on the merits with a degree of particularity
that goes beyond generalized claims that the tax benefits "will do
great things for the U.S. economy" or "the provisions are no worse
than the ones you have enacted for other special interest groups." In
other words, we are sure that the Joint Committee Staff had a larger
purpose than a labeling exercise. If that is the case, it is difficult to un-
137 See id. at 41.
1 See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8, at 532-33.
1 See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 61(a)(1), (a)(2), 63, 702, 1366; ELISABETH A. OWENS, THE
FOREIGN TAX CREDIT 3 (1961) ("[T]he source or nature of income, whether it is from
one type of business or another, earned or unearned, from a foreign or domestic
source, is largely immaterial in the basic tax structure.").
'1 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT:
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION - PROPOSALS ON
UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND OF THE FOREIGN INCOME OF
UNITED STATES PERSONS 171-72 (1987).
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derstand why the Joint Committee Staff's new approach allowed tax-
induced structural distortions to undergo a less rigorous cost/benefit
analysis than its narrowed definition of tax subsidies. Both types of
provisions often raise serious equity and administrability concerns as
well as efficiency concerns and the proponents of both types of provi-
sions should be required to show that the benefits of the provisions
exceed all of their costs (including the tax policy costs).
IV. RESPONDING TO THE CRITICISMS OF TEA
Not only did the Staff's 2008-2010 approach result in a less robust
iteration of TEA than the traditional version based on the SHS base-
line, but it was also based on a false premise - that the criticisms of
the SHS baseline could not be successfully countered and, therefore,
that they had to be avoided by substantially disconnecting TEA from
its long-established normative moorings. To the contrary, it appears to
us that the criticisms of SHS-grounded TEA are unpersuasive and
should be rejected. We have cataloged these attacks and replied to
them at length in an earlier articlel41 and we refer interested readers to
that prior work. We have also responded to some of those criticisms in
142Part III.A., above. In this Part IV, we will focus principally on five
critiques of the SHS baseline, two of which were identified by the
Joint Committee Staff as requiring a move to its 2008-2010 construct
because, in the Staff's view, they had not been convincingly answered.
We will disagree with the Joint Committee Staff's conclusion that
convincing rebuttals to certain attacks on TEA's conventional norma-
tive baseline are lacking and we will, therefore, conclude that no new
TEA approach was required.
A. A Quartet of Questionable Objections
In its 2008 report, the Joint Committee Staff argued that propo-
nents of traditional TEA had failed to adequately respond to criti-
cisms that (1) the SHS "normal tax" baseline is underspecified and (2)
TEA is in reality a tool for promoting a tax reform agenda. 143 We have
dealt with the criticisms of the "normal tax" baseline above.'" In sum,
we believe that the SHS baseline does indeed have a core set of co-
141 See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8.
142 See supra notes 87-119 and accompanying text.
143 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17, at
35.
1 See supra notes 87-119 and accompanying text.
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herent principles that are widely accepted in the context of an income
tax system. Thus, contrary to the Joint Committee Staff's 2008 report,
the claim that the normal tax (SHS) baseline is merely a "series of ul-
timately idiosyncratic or pragmatic choices" 145 simply cannot with-
stand scrutiny. In our view, the discussion in Part III.A., above, dem-
onstrates that the SHS baseline is both principled and workable in
applying TEA to specific tax provisions or proposals in an income tax
system.
In response to the Joint Committee Staff's assertion that propo-
nents of the SHS baseline have not satisfactorily answered the criti-
cism that TEA is a tool for advancing tax reform proposals aimed at
promoting an income tax base, we would say that, of course, TEA can
and has been used as an instrument of tax reform. By bringing to the
light of day tax subsidy provisions that cannot survive a rigorous
cost/benefit analysis, TEA unapologetically provides support for tax
reform proposals aimed at eliminating those indefensible provisions
and, thus, TEA does have an aspirational component. This sensible
effect of TEA surely should not be a basis for criticism. And, in an in-
come tax system, the TEA baseline will necessarily be grounded in in-
come tax principles (we believe that SHS is the proper baseline for
this purpose) and that means TEA will definitely be used to support
income tax reform rather than a move to a consumption tax regime. If
Congress decided to replace the income tax base with a consumption
tax base, then the baseline would be different but TEA would still be
an important tool.146 With that different baseline, for example, the sav-
ings incentive provisions in current tax law that are treated as tax ex-
penditures would be part of the normal consumption tax baseline.147
We readily acknowledge that to be the case but fail to see how that
point is an appropriate critique of TEA as applied in an income tax
system. Instead, that point really is a demand that the income tax be
replaced with a consumption tax regime, an issue that is outside the
scope of this article.148 TEA is agnostic with respect to the question of
1 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 7, at 36.
146 Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8, at 508-09; see supra notes 30-33 with
accompanying text.
1 On the other hand, there are numerous other tax expenditure provisions un-
der an SHS baseline that would also be tax expenditures if a consumption tax baseline
were used. Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8, at 509-10.
148 Stated differently, in our view, much of the dispute about the traditional TEA
baseline is really a dispute about the appropriate base (income versus consumption)
for the federal tax system and not a dispute about whether SHS is a sufficiently neu-
tral and principled TEA baseline in the context of an income tax system. See
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whether an income tax should be preferred over a consumption tax or
vice versa. 149 TEA merely requires that if net income has been chosen
as the tax base, tax provisions that depart from the function of prop-
erly defining net income and providing reasonable means for imposing
a tax thereon should be identified and evaluated as government pro-
grams effected through the tax system. As we stated in our earlier ar-
ticle, "if TEA is a clandestine device for promoting base broadening,
then it is a salutary tool for pursuing a widely shared tax policy
goal.,,..o
The Joint Committee Staff also discussed the argument that TEA
represents inappropriate "tax exceptionalism" - the supposedly un-
realistic idea that the tax system should be treated specially and be
free of the political compromises that are present in direct spending
programs and other actions of the federal government."' The Joint
Committee Staff itself rebuts this criticism in its 2008 report. The tax
system is special in that it affects virtually every person and special in-
terest tax provisions undermine the self-assessment tax system itself
by creating the perception in taxpayers that the system is unfair and
unworthy of support. These special interest tax provisions thereby un-
dercut the voluntary taxpayer compliance that is essential to making
the tax system function effectively. Thus, the tax system merits having
a special analytical tool like TEA to analyze the efficacy of tax subsidy
112provisions. We would further argue that TEA does not really repre-
sent tax exceptionalism. It is merely a tool for making sure that gov-
ernment programs operated through the tax system are carefully ana-
lyzed and do not avoid accountability. In other words, rather than
treating tax subsidy provisions as having an "exceptional" status that
exempts them from normal governmental program scrutiny, TEA at-
tempts to bring analytical parity between direct government programs
and tax expenditure programs by requiring that tax expenditure pro-
grams undergo an appropriately rigorous cost/benefit review.
WILLIAM D. ANDREWS & PETER J. WIEDENBECK, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
532 (6th ed. 2009) ("Much of the recent criticism of tax expenditure analysis seems to
come from proponents of consumption taxes.").
149 Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8, at 492.
1so Id. at 490.
151 See Kyle Logue, If Taxpayers Can't Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can: A Public
Choice Perspective on the Tax Transition Debate, 67 U. CHI, L. REV. 1507, 1525
(2000); Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 26, at 957, 968.
152 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17,
at 37 (stating that the Joint Committee Staff "believes that there is merit in a pre-
sumption in favor of a tax system that is as simple and as easy to administer as possi-
ble").
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Finally, in its 2008 report, the Joint Committee Staff raised and
dismissed what it called the "last penny" argument - namely, the
claim that TEA "is based on the 'sinister premise ... [that one should]
think of all income tax as virtual state property, and forbearance to
tax away every last penny as itself a tax expenditure.' 15 ' The Joint
Committee Staff rejected this argument by citing and quoting from
our earlier article on tax expenditure theory.154 In that prior work, we
dismissed the "last penny" argument against TEA, as follows:
... TEA, however, cannot be interpreted as implying
that ... [Congress'] taxing power makes the federal govern-
ment the owner of all income earned by U.S. residents unless
TEA can be fairly understood as asserting that Congress has
a normative obligation to adopt a generally applicable income
tax and that 100% is the normatively correct rate for such a
tax. TEA does not, however, require the enactment of an in-
come tax and it does not, in fact, prescribe any particular level
of generally applicable income taxation as normatively cor-
rect. Moreover, TEA does not dictate that revenue gained by
eliminating tax expenditures must be spent by the federal
government. Indeed, TEA has nothing to say about whether
such revenue should be used for direct expenditure purposes
or to pay for tax rate reductions.
B. The Weisbach and Nussim Critique: Is Tax Policy Relevant to
TEA?
In addition to the criticisms discussed immediately above, there
has been a relatively recent challenge to TEA by Professors David
Weisbach and Jacob Nussim. 15 We have made a detailed response to
the Weisbach and Nussim challenge in our earlier article and inter-
ested readers are directed to that work5 7 but we wish to make one ad-
ditional point. Weisbach's and Nussim's principal argument is that the
controlling question regarding tax expenditures is whether particular
subsidies and incentives are best operated through the tax system or
153 Id. at 35 (quoting from Charles Fried, Whose Money Is It?, WASH. POST, Jan.
1, 1995, at C-7).
15 See id. at 38.
Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8, at 492-93 (footnotes omitted); see also
Shaviro, Rethinking, supra note 12, at 204.
156 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 26.
15 See Fleming & Peroni, supra note 8.
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through some other means such as a direct expenditure program ad-
ministered by a nontax agency.
They contend that when answering this question, "It is entirely ir-
relevant whether some piece of government policy complies with in-
dependent tax norms"l5 9 such as the ability-to-pay and neutrality prin-
ciples. Tax norms, however, deal with (1) the fairness of the tax
burden distribution, (2) whether taxpayers can sufficiently understand
the law, (3) whether taxpayers can comply with the law and whether
the government can administer it at a reasonable cost, (4) whether the
tax system distorts taxpayer choices, (5) whether the system raises
adequate revenue, and (6) whether the system is conducive to eco-
nomic growth. If Weisbach and Nussim mean for their above quoted
statement to be taken literally, and there seems to be no reason to be-
lieve otherwise, then they are arguing that we should disregard all of
these tax policy concerns when deciding whether to operate govern-
ment programs through the tax system. This argument overlooks the
facts that the primary purpose of the federal income tax is to raise
revenue for federal government purposes,'6 that a high degree of vol-
untary compliance is required for the income tax to perform this func-
161tion, and that the application of cost/benefit analysis to any tax ex-
penditure must seriously consider the effects of its complexities and
inequities (if any) on the Service's treatment of taxpayers, on volun-
tary taxpayer compliance, and on the ability of the Service to effec-
tively perform its enforcement function.162 In the words of a prominent
158 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 26, at 973-76. Weisbach and Nussim frankly
admit that this is a difficult and complex question to answer. See id. at 992-1023.
159 Id. at 958.
160 See STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY TAX POLICY, supra note 92, at 15; Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, The Case for a Consumption Tax 113 TAX NOTES 373, 375 (Oct. 23,
2006); Sullivan, Tax Incentives, supra note 118, at 22. For a different statement of the
same principle, see Andrews, Personal Deductions, supra note 29, at 313 ("[T]he pri-
mary . .. effect of the [income] tax . .. is to reduce private consumption and accumu-
lation in order to free resources for public use.").
161 The overall Service audit coverage rate for returns of individuals was below
1% for the fiscal years 2000-2006 and barely above 1% for the fiscal years 2007-2009
inclusive. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXAMINATION - INDIVIDUAL RETURN
CLOSURES AND COVERAGE RATES, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-drop/fy_2009_enforcement results.pdf.
162 See 1 U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM, supra note 106, at 9; GRAETZ, THE
U.S. INCOME TAX, supra note 99, at 105-07; SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES, supra note 7, at 26-27; Kleinbard, Framework Legislation, supra note
10, at 373; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Economics and Tax Reform: 1986 and Now, 113
TAX NOTES 362, 363 (Apr. 4, 2006); Sullivan, Tax Incentives, supra note 118, at 22; see
also Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 FORDHAM
2010] A Critique of the "New Paradigm" and Its Denouement
international tax commentator:
There can be no other legal subject - no courts, no legisla-
ture, no functioning democracy - without a tax system. And
as the tax system of a country fractures and loses legitimacy,
so does representational government. There is nothing more
important, because everything of value that a government
does, from national security to healthcare, flows from the tax
system.163
Weisbach's and Nussim's insistence on ignoring tax policy norms
apparently would require policymakers to disregard the negative ef-
fects to the tax system, and to the government, caused by the adverse
impact on compliance and enforcement arising from complexities and
inequities engendered by tax expenditures.'6 By contrast, TEA pro-
vides a cost/benefit framework within which to answer the question on
which Professors Weisbach and Nussim are focused (simplification
and coordination versus specialization)1 65 but that also requires a
broader inquiry that includes critical issues affecting compliance and
administration, such as distributional fairness, distortive effects, and
general effectiveness,166 in addition to coordination, governmental
simplification, and specialization.
The immediately preceding discussion allows us to segue into a
closely related point - TEA is an important tool for defending the
health of the tax system. Revenue, the principal product of the tax sys-
tem, is the ultimate determinant of the scope and effectiveness of
L. REV. 395, 425-26 (1987); Edward Yorio, The Future of Tax Reform: A Rejoinder to
Professor Zelinsky, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 899, 904-05 (1987).
1 H. David Rosenbloom, Where's the Pony? Reflections on the Making of Inter-
national Tax Policy, 57 TAX NOTES INT'L 153 (Jan. 11, 2010).
16 Regarding such complexities and inequities, see PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY
PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS, supra note 10, at 5; STAFF OF JOINT
ECON. COMM., 109TH CONG., INDIVIDUALS AND THE COMPLIANCE COSTS OF
TAXATION 6 (Joint Comm. Print 2005); SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES,
supra note 7, at 107; Blum, supra note 118, at 83; Toder, supra note 117, at 370.
16 Professors Weisbach and Nussim provide a thoughtful demonstration of how
cost/benefit analysis applies to their focus issue by discussing the possibility of inte-
grating the food stamp program into the income tax system. See Weisbach & Nussim,
supra note 26, at 997-1023; see also Toder, supra note 117, at 368-69.
16 See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, PROPOSALS,
supra note 10, at 83 ("[T]he Panel believes that ... tax preferences should be treated
like any direct spending program, and should be evaluated by policymakers based on
objective criteria, such as their cost, the distribution of their benefits, overall effec-
tiveness, and the appropriateness of administering them through the tax system.").
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many important government programs. In a country as large and
complex as the United States, the needed revenue can be produced
only by a healthy tax system - i.e., a tax system that is adequate in
terms of its revenue raising capacity, that is administrable by the reve-
nue authority, and that attracts a high degree of voluntary compliance
by taxpayers. Voluntary compliance, in turn, is importantly related to
the perceived fairness of the tax system and to its level of complexity.
Tax provisions that undermine taxpayer compliance because of their
inequity or complexity and tax provisions that erode the capacity of
the Service to administer the tax law degrade the health of the tax sys-
tem and undermine the government's principal revenue source.
TEA is highly relevant to this concern because it forces tax ex-
penditures to undergo a cost/benefit analysis that identifies and high-
lights tax provisions whose costs to the health of the tax system out-
weigh any net gains that are otherwise achieved from using a tax
expenditure in place of a direct expenditure program. Thus, TEA is
much more than a labeling exercise; it is a guardian of the revenue
raising capacity of the tax system, and therefore, a guardian of many
other governmental functions. This is an additional point that is over-
looked by the Weisbach and Nussim approach.
Another important justification for TEA that seems undervalued
by Weisbach and Nussim relates to the federal budget. Surrey's pri-
mary motivation for initially advancing TEA seems to have been to
more completely illuminate the full cost of the federal government
through the production of a tax expenditure budget that identifies the
revenue lost by individual tax expenditures. In theory, these indi-
vidual losses could then be combined into a total tax expenditure cost.
Ironically, this quantitative aspect is the weakest component of
TEA, largely because the revenue loss estimates for the individual tax
expenditure items are computed on a mostly static basis.16 Thus, the
revenue loss estimate for each tax expenditure is far from precise. It is
not an accurate measure of what would be gained by repealing a par-
ticular tax expenditure, and, therefore, not an accurate measure of the
169
cost of that tax expenditure.
In spite of this inaccuracy, however, the quantitative aspect of
TEA is useful from a budget standpoint for several reasons. First, tax
167 See Surrey, Full Accounting, supra note 14, at 576-78.
'" See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 2008 ESTIMATES, supra note 53, at
40-41.
169 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 2009 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES , supra
note 17, at 288.
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expenditure estimates are usually more accurate than totally ignoring
all revenue loss, thereby effectively assigning a zero cost to tax expen-
ditures. Stated differently, these estimates help dispel the political illu-
sion that tax expenditures are somehow "free," unlike direct govern-
mental expenditures. Second, closely related to this point is that tax
expenditure estimates help make the resulting revenue loss a part of
budget consciousness. Third, these estimates, inaccurate though they
may be, provide some sense of the magnitude of the related tax ex-
penditures and allow them to be compared at least roughly to direct
expenditure alternatives. It would certainly be worthwhile, however,
to investigate the possibility of improving the accuracy of tax expendi-
ture estimates by including in their preparation the dynamic elements
that are used when calculating the revenue increases or decreases that
are projected to result from tax rate changes."o
V. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis in this article has contended that traditional TEA,
which uses the SHS baseline in identifying tax expenditure provisions,
is properly grounded in the ability-to-pay and neutrality principles. It
has an established core that makes it an important and effective ana-
lytical tool of tax policy, notwithstanding the many criticisms that it
has endured over the years. In our view, the central purpose of TEA is
to serve as a triggering mechanism for a rigorous cost/benefit analysis
of governmental programs implemented through the federal income
tax system and the SHS baseline is the appropriate measuring rod for
this purpose. Stated differently, TEA's main focus is on transparency
and accountability concerning governmental programs delivered
through the tax system. It is meant to have a much needed restraining
effect on the strong impulse by Congress to enact governmental pro-
grams in the form of tax incentives and subsidies that would not pass
muster under a cost/benefit analysis as direct spending programs and
that would have a detrimental effect on income tax compliance and
enforcement. Thus, we welcome the Joint Committee Staff's 2008-
2010 effort to reinvigorate TEA as a tool of tax policy analysis, but be-
lieve that if its rejection of the SHS baseline had endured, it would
170 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 17,
at 81-82; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, OVERVIEW OF REVENUE ESTIMATING
PROCEDURES AND METHODOLOGIES USED BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
ON TAXATION 18-19 (Joint Comm. Print 2005); Edward D. Kleinbard & Patrick
Driessen, A Revenue Estimate Case Study: The Repatriation Holiday Revisited, 120
TAX NOTES 1191, 1193 (Sept. 22, 2008).
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have undermined, rather than strengthened, TEA. We also believe
that the Joint Committee Staff's 2008 report gave far too much cre-
dence to the critics of the SHS baseline, which is a widely accepted cri-
terion for evaluating income tax provisions. In addition, we believe
the Joint Committee Staff's 2008-2010 TEA approach would not have
satisfied most critics of TEA and would have opened up new avenues
of attack on the TEA process. For these reasons, we applaud the de-
nouement of the "new paradigm" and welcome the Joint Committee
Staff's return to the SHS baseline.
